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Westover Park8/30/2005
The plaintiffs, Westover Park, Inc., Stop 77 Havemeyer, Ron Zussman, Jeanne DeLoe and Dean DeLoe, appeal from the ruling of the trial court modifying the special exception issued to the defendants Starwood Buckingham, LLC (Starwood), and Leandro Rizzuto by the defendant zoning board of the city of Stamford (board). Prior to oral argument before this court, we ordered supplemental briefs on the question of whether a final judgment exists. We conclude that it does not and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.
This zoning litigation involves a parcel of land owned by Rizzuto consisting of approximately 19.8 acres located in a C-D designed commercial district zone on Havemeyer Lane in Stamford. To develop residential dwellings in that zone, a special exception is required, as is site plan approval. The parcel presently contains a vacant 117,562 square foot commercial office building and 180 parking spaces.
In the spring of 2001, Starwood filed applications for a special exception and site plan approval to construct residential townhouses on the parcel. The board granted the applications on February 11, 2002, subject to twenty-five conditions. From that decision, the plaintiffs appealed pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8 (b). Their principal contention was that, in imposing conditions on its approval, the board improperly delegated implementation of those conditions to other persons and agencies.
In its memorandum of decision dated December 18, 2003, the court concluded: " he conditions imposed by the zoning board on its approval of Starwood's applications require modification, including deletion of the alternatives in some cases of making a cash payment to the city instead of actual construction. It makes little sense simply to sustain the appeal of the plaintiffs on this one narrow ground in light of the defendant zoning board's very thorough review and approval of these applications. As the plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof, except with regard to the zoning board's delegation of its authority, the decision and approval of the applications is accepted in all other respects." Thus, while agreeing with the plaintiffs' principal contention, the court did not sustain the plaintiffs' appeal. Rather, it modified the board's conditions and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue, which was denied. The plaintiffs then filed with this court a timely petition for certification to appeal, which was granted on April 22, 2004. This appeal followed, in which the plaintiffs' sole claim is that the court improperly "ordered a constrained remand once it had determined that material conditions were improperly attached to the [board's] approval." Prior to oral argument before this court, we ordered supplemental briefs on the question of whether a final judgment exists. We now consider that question.
"The lack of a final judgment implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to hear an appeal. A determination regarding . . . subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . . [and, therefore] our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sweeney v. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193, 207, 856 A.2d 997 (2004).
Appellate court jurisdiction is limited to final judgments of the trial court. General Statutes § 52-263; Practice Book § 61-1. This principle has endured through centuries of Connecticut jurisprudence. See Gleason v. Chester, 1 Day 27 (1802). In State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 463 A.2d 566 (1983), our Supreme Court explained: "The right of appeal is purely statutory. It is accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking
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