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Union Carbide Corp. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado12/1/2005
ORDER AFFIRMED
Marquez and Piccone, JJ., concur
The single issue in this case is whether Union Carbide Corporation and its insurer, American Motorists Insurance Company (collectively employer), should be solely liable for workers' compensation death benefits payable to Dorothy W. Spencer (claimant), or whether the Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) should share in that liability. We conclude that only employer is liable, and therefore affirm the order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel).
The dispositive facts are undisputed. Allen Y. Spencer (decedent) worked as an underground uranium miner from 1959 until 1984, and worked for employer for the last eighteen years of his career. In 1999, he died of silicosis or pneumoconiosis caused by exposure to radioactive materials. These illnesses had been diagnosed before 1994. Claimant, as decedent's spouse, sought death benefits.
The law concerning the occupational diseases that afflicted decedent was amended between the date of diagnosis and the date of death. Under the prior law, the last employer was liable for only the first $10,000 of benefits, and any remaining benefits were paid from the SIF. Colo. Sess. Laws 1990, ch. 62, § 8-41-304(2) at 480-81; see Henderson v. RSI, Inc., 824 P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1991)(applying pre-1994 law in finding that the SIF is liable for compensation in excess of $10,000).
In 1993, the General Assembly amended § 8-41-304(2), effective April 1, 1994, to delete any reference to the SIF, thereby rendering the last employer liable for all compensation attributable to the listed diseases. Colo. Sess. Laws 1993, ch. 351 at 2140, 2145. At the same time, § 8-46-104 was amended to provide that no cases would be accepted into the SIF "for occupational diseases occurring on or after April 1, 1994." Colo. Sess. Laws 1993, ch. 351 at 2142 (emphasis added); see Subsequent Injury Fund v. King, 961 P.2d 575 (Colo. App. 1998)(discussing legislative history). Hence, this case turns on the meaning of "occurring."
Employer argued before the administrative law judge (ALJ) and argues on appeal that because decedent's disease was diagnosed before April 1994, it "occurred" prior to that date. Therefore, relying on the earlier version of § 8-41-304(2), employer sought to shift to the SIF all but $10,000 in liability.
The ALJ concluded that "occurring" required actual disability or death from a covered occupational disease, rather than only a diagnosis. Applying this interpretation to decedent's death in 1999, the ALJ further concluded that his disease did not "occur" within the meaning of § 8-46-104 until after the closure of the SIF for occupational diseases. Therefore, the ALJ held that employer was solely liable for claimant's death benefits. The Panel affirmed. We agree with the ALJ and the Panel.
In construing a statute, we must give effect to the legislative intent. See Sears Distribution Ctr. v. Indus. Claims Appeals Office, 104 P.3d 313 (Colo. App. 2004). Hence, "occurring" should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) should be construed to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. See Davison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 84 P.3d 1023 (Colo. 2004). But if statutory language is fairly susceptible to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous, and we may resort to other aids in statutory construction, including the consequences of various constructions and any legislative history. See Pena v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 117 P.3d 84 (Colo. App. 2004).
The parties acknowledge, and we agree, that the question of when an occupational disease "occurs" for purposes of worker
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