 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Grupe Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board9/15/2005
overy shall close on the date of the mandatory settlement conference. Evidence not disclosed or obtained thereafter shall not be admissible unless the proponent of the evidence can demonstrate that it was not available or could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence prior to the settlement conference." (Italics added.)
The purpose of the disclosure requirement in section 5502 is self-evident: "`to guarantee a productive dialogue leading, if not to expeditious resolution of the whole dispute, to thorough and accurate framing of the stipulations and issues for hearing.' [Citation.]" (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 675, 684-685.)
In the present case, the parties filed a mandatory settlement conference statement (statement) at the mandatory settlement conference on July 10, 2001. The statement listed "Dan Sidhu re Le Beauf ." The statement contains no reference to any report or exhibit relating to Sidhu, nor is there any reference to the substance of Sidhu's proposed testimony. The WCJ closed discovery on July 10, 2001, with the exception of allowing the parties to send film to the respective doctors for comment.
At trial, Sidhu testified he received the referral requesting his services on July 11, 2001. Sidhu met with Ridgeway thrice, and all meetings took place after the close of discovery on July 10, 2001. He testified he made his determination as to Ridgeway's vocational prospects after August 17, 2001. Sidhu did not prepare a report prior to trial, nor did Ridgeway request such a report. Sidhu described the evaluation process as on a "rush basis."
Ridgeway claims expert testimony opinion is not "further discovery" governed by section 5502. According to Ridgeway, "Respondent's expert was disclosed at the [mandatory settlement conference], which is all that is required . . . . Moreover, Respondent could not have acted with more diligence in regard to this witness, as the respondent made clear her intention to present expert opinion regarding LeBoeuf factors as early as January 11, 2001 in writing to the defendant." Ridgeway also asserts "It was improper for the WCJ to view expert opinion testimony as `discovery'. It is not expert opinion until it is given. It can change at the time of trial."
The amicus curiae echoes Ridgeway's characterization of expert testimony as outside the scope of section 5502: "Preparation of trial testimony by a witness for the party intending to offer that testimony is not an identified discovery activity except where that witness is a medical expert. While the act of an adverse party to ascertain the likely testimony of such an individual by deposition clearly falls within discovery within a workers' compensation claim. The preparation for such testimony is not discovery."
"In construing a statute, our role is limited to ascertaining the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] We look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] If the statutory language on its face answers the question, that answer is binding unless we conclude the language is ambiguous or it does not accurately reflect the Legislature's intent. [Citations.]" (Palmer v. GTE California, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1265, 1271.)
Here, if the mandatory settlement conference does not settle the dispute between the parties, section 5502 requires the filing of a pretrial conference statement identifying the specific issues in dispute, each party's proposed permanent disability rating, the exhibits, and the witnesses. Nothing in the plain language of section 5502 requires
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 California Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|