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Sanchez v. Children's Hospital and Health Center9/14/2005
ecords. Thus, there is no basis for Sanchez's objection to this evidence.
Third, as for the objection to Niedzwiecki's statement that Patient and Family Services was not a formal department until March 2003, Sanchez did not make an evidentiary objection to this statement in the trial court. Rather, she simply argued in her briefing that it was demonstrably untrue as it conflicted with other evidence. Based on her failure to object below, the issue has not been preserved for appeal. (See Evid. Code, ยง 353.)
In sum, we conclude that the evidence Sanchez challenges was not necessary for Children's to carry its burden, and further Sanchez's evidentiary objections are without merit. We thus reject all of Sanchez's arguments that are premised on the inadmissibility of Children's supporting evidence.
C. Sanchez Did Not Meet Her Burden to Create a Triable Issue of Material Fact that Children's Intentionally Discriminated Against Her Based on Her Age
Having concluded that Children's set forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for Sanchez's termination, we next analyze whether Sanchez has identified evidence sufficient to permit a finding that Children's nevertheless intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of age. " hen the employer proffers a facially sufficient lawful reason for the challenged action, the entire McDonnell Douglas framework ceases to have any bearing on the case, and the question becomes whether the plaintiff has shown, or can show, that the challenged action resulted in fact from discriminatory animus rather than other causes." (Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 112.) "The ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of actual discrimination remains with the plaintiff." (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 356.) Sanchez may meet her burden "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." (Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 256.) Our inquiry is whether there is "evidence supporting a rational inference that intentional discrimination, on grounds prohibited by the statute, was the true cause of the employer's actions." (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 361.)
Sanchez argues that she has set forth sufficient evidence to reasonably support a finding of discrimination because: (1) she identified other older employees with seniority who had been terminated; (2) a younger employee - Ortega - was hired to perform Sanchez's job and other roles Niedzwiecki suggested would be assigned to her; (3) Sanchez was not hired for any of the other jobs for which she applied; and (4) Children's refused to give Sanchez an "Exception to Policy" so she would not lose her retirement benefits. As we explain, none of these facts are sufficient to create a triable issue on whether Children's terminated Sanchez because of her age. We examine each of Sanchez's arguments in turn.
We first consider Sanchez's attempt to rely on Children's treatment of other older workers to establish a triable issue of material fact regarding Children's intent to discriminate against her. Not every type of statistical evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, let alone carry plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving discrimination. "For [plaintiffs] to show a prima facie case of disparate treatment based solely on statistics [plaintiffs] must show a '"stark" pattern' of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than age." (Palmer v. United States (9th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 534, 539; Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co. (9th Cir. 1990) 902 F.2d 1417, 1423.) A plaintiff may not rely on a stati
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