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Sanchez v. Children's Hospital and Health Center9/14/2005
ker was laid off, while younger employees were retained in similar jobs, or were reassigned to positions for which the plaintiff also qualified." (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 367.)
Children's does not dispute that Sanchez meets the initial three elements of the prima facie case, in that she is a member of a protected class, was performing competently in her position and suffered an adverse employment action. However, Children's argues that Sanchez cannot establish the fourth element in that she "did not and [cannot] present evidence of any 'circumstance suggesting a discriminatory motive.'"
In light of the lack of settled approach to the final element of a plaintiff's prima facie case in a reduction in force situation and because it is not necessary for us to do so in this case, we decline to reach the issue of whether the evidence here establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination. Instead, we assume, without deciding, that Sanchez established a prima facie case, allowing us to move to the next two steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. In deciding to take this approach, we note that the parties have proceeded well beyond a discussion of Sanchez's prima facie case and have presented ample argument concerning the final two steps in the age discrimination analysis. In similar circumstances, our Supreme Court has exercised its discretion to bypass the issue of plaintiff's prima facie case, proceeding directly to the final two steps in the age discrimination analysis. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 357 [declining to rule on prima facie case because " n its summary judgment motion, [the employer] did not stand mute, relying solely on the premise that [plaintiff] failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of age discrimination" but "proceeded . . . to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas formula"].) We follow our high court's lead and proceed to the next steps of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
B. Children's Met Its Burden to Show a Nondiscriminatory Basis for Sanchez's Termination
Assuming - as we do here - that Sanchez has established a prima facie case, "the burden shifts to [Children's] to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence, sufficient to 'raise a genuine issue of fact' and to 'justify a judgment for the [employer],' that its action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 355-356, quoting Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at pp. 254-255.)
Children's must do more than simply state that Sanchez was terminated because of a reduction in force; it must specifically explain why Sanchez's position became subject to the reduction. " n employer may very well implement an economically necessary reduction in force and still, at the same time, violate antidiscrimination laws because the selection of who is to be laid off is based on some illegal criteria." (O'Mary v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 563, 580.) Where, as here, the employer identifies a reduction in force as the nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, " nvocation of a right to downsize does not resolve whether the employer had a discriminatory motive for cutting back its work force, or engaged in intentional discrimination in deciding which individual workers to retain and release. Where these are the issues, the employer's explanation must address them." (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358.)
Children's has met its burden to produce evidence showing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Sanchez's termination, going beyond the bare fact of a reduction in force. It has done this by setting forth specific facts explaining (1) why Sanchez's position was no longer necessary and was eliminated,
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