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Sanchez v. Children's Hospital and Health Center9/14/2005
ficient to support a finding in its favor that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for Sanchez's termination, which will satisfy the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework and also carry its initial burden on summary judgment. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 357.) In that case, the burden shifts both under the summary judgment analysis and under the McDonnell Douglas framework, and our inquiry becomes whether Sanchez has met her burden "to rebut this facially dispositive showing by pointing to evidence which nonetheless raises a rational inference that intentional discrimination occurred." (Guz, supra, at p. 357.)
A. Sanchez's Prima Facie Case
We first turn to Children's argument that Sanchez cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Although " he specific elements of a prima facie case may vary depending on the particular facts," a prima facie case of disparate impact employment discrimination generally includes evidence showing "(1) [plaintiff] was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive." (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355.) "Because it lacks probative value, the fact that an [age discrimination] plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case," but rather "the prima facie case requires 'evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a [illegal] discriminatory criterion . . . .'" (O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. (1996) 517 U.S. 308, 312-313.)
In a case such as this, where the plaintiff is an older worker terminated as part of a reduction in force, the final element of the prima facie case must be adjusted to fit a reduction in force situation. In a reduction in force case, "where jobs are eliminated and duties reallocated during a general work force reduction, the issue of discriminatory motive becomes more complicated." (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 366.) In that case, a plaintiff must "show, prima facie, that persons significantly younger, but otherwise similarly situated, were '"treated more favorably."'" (Ibid.) This is because "the decision to discharge a qualified, older employee is not inherently suspicious [and in] a [reduction in force], qualified employees are going to be discharged." (Brocklehurst v. PPG Industries, Inc. (6th Cir. 1997) 123 F.3d 890, 896.)
The federal courts have not set forth a uniform formula for a plaintiff to follow in establishing a prima facie age discrimination case in a reduction in force situation. The "further showing" required for a prima facie age discrimination case in a reduction in force situation "could take many forms. . . . Such showing could be made . . . by statistical evidence (as, for example, where a pattern of forced early retirement or failure to promote older employees can be shown) or circumstantial evidence (such as a demonstration of a preference for younger employees in the business organization)," with the caveat that "the factually-oriented, case-by-case nature of [age discrimination] claims requires that we not be overly rigid in our consideration of the evidence of discrimination a plaintiff may offer." (Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc. (8th Cir. 1985) 771 F.2d 1161, 1166.) As our Supreme Court has observed, some federal court decisions hold that "a prima facie inference of discrimination can arise from evidence that during a work force reduction, a satisfactory age-protected wor
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