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Hogan v. City and County of San Francisco10/19/2005
ed judgment in favor of the City.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Retaliation
Hogan contends that his cause of action alleging retaliation for exercising his rights under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA) should not have been dismissed.
Our review of an order granting summary adjudication is governed by the same principles applicable to summary judgment rulings. (Lomes v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 127, 131.) "A motion for summary judgment must be granted if all of the papers submitted show `there is no triable issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (Sheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 69 (Sheiding).) "The trial court's summary judgment rulings are subject to de novo review. [Citation.]" (Ibid.) "In performing our de novo review, we must view the evidence in a light favorable to [appellant] as the losing party [citation], liberally construing evidentiary submission while strictly scrutinizing [respondent's] own showing, and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff's favor." [Citations.] (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768-769.)
The CFRA is a portion of the Fair Employment and Housing Act that provides "`protections to employees needing family leave or medical leave.' [Citation.] `CFRA generally provides that it is unlawful for an employer to refuse an employee's request for up to 12 weeks of "family care and medical leave" in a year. (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd. (a).) An employer is also forbidden from discharging or discriminating against an employee who requests family leave or medical leave. (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd. (l).)'" (Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 260 (Dudley); see also Gibbs v. American Airlines, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 (Gibbs).)
The elements of a cause of action for retaliation in violation of the CFRA are: "(1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA; (2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA leave; (3) the plaintiff exercised right to take leave for a qualifying CFRA purpose; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of exercise of right to CFRA leave." (Dudley, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.)
The trial court found that Hogan could not prevail on this claim because (1) he did not have a qualifying purpose for taking leave and (2) he did not suffer an adverse employment action because he exercised a right to CFRA leave. We limit our analysis to the first of these two grounds for granting summary adjudication. Hogan contends that he was qualified to take CFRA leave because of the serious health condition he developed on April 10, 2000. We disagree.
"Leave for an employee's health condition requires a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or her position." (Stevens v. Department of Corrections (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 285, 292.) "An employee's `serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of that employee' is CFRA-qualifying leave." (Gibbs, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 7, quoting Gov. Code § 12945.2, subd. (c)(3)(C).)
Here, the record before us does not contain any evidence that Hogan was unable to perform the functions of his job because of a serious health condition. There is no evidence that any doctor or health care provider ever determined that Hogan could not perform his job functions or imposed any work restrictions on him. Indeed, Dr. Stahl, who evaluated Hogan in connection
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