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Raghavan v. Boeing Co.10/31/2005
hus, the gist or sting of the reprimand - that Raghavan engaged in misrepresentative behavior toward a number of senior management personnel - was true. Raghavan's defamation cause of action was therefore without merit as a matter of law.
2. Implied Contract
It is well settled that an employee who has signed an express at- will agreement cannot prevail on an implied contract cause of action. (See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 340, fn. 10 [collecting cases]; see id. at p. 346 [implied contract may exist where purported at-will provision is ambiguous]; see id. at p. 340, fn. 11 [the "more clear, prominent, complete, consistent, and all-encompassing" the at-will language, "the greater the likelihood that workers could not form any reasonable contrary understanding"].) As this court has previously stated: "`There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.'" (Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 630 [affirming summary adjudication for employer on implied contract cause of action where employees had signed an acknowledgment form stating that employment was at will].)
Raghavan argues he had an implied contract requiring good cause for termination based on BSS's personnel policies, such as: (1) "Guidelines for Selecting Employees for Layoff," which base layoff decisions on employees' skills, experience, performance, and future potential; (2) a written policy to "retain the best qualified people available"; (3) "Ethics Policy & Procedures," committing the company to treat its employees fairly, with trust and respect, and to refrain from retaliating against them; and (4) assurances from the human resources department that employees selected for layoff would have a meaningful opportunity to apply, and be fairly considered, for employment openings in the company.
In Tomlinson v. Qualcomm, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 934, the plaintiff made the same argument as Raghavan, without success. As the court explained: "[The plaintiff] argues that the family leave policy contained in [the company's] personnel manual created an implied-in-fact agreement of continued employment. Although the California courts will under some circumstances imply an agreement contrary to the statutorily presumed at-will status, the courts will not imply an agreement if doing so necessarily varies the terms of an express at-will employment agreement signed by the employee. . . . For example, in Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 799, the employee signed a job application form acknowledging that if hired she would be employed on an at-will basis, and also signed an employment agreement confirming she would be employed on an at-will basis. (Id. at pp. 802-803.) After her employment was later terminated as part of a company reduction in work force, she argued that her employment termination violated an implied agreement, based in part on the employer's written personnel policies, that her employment would be terminated only for cause. The court rejected that argument, stating: `Here, . . . the parties intended the application and employee agreement to memorialize their understanding with respect to grounds for termination. Consequently, "evidence of an implied agreement [that] contradicts the terms of the written agreement is not admissible. . . ." . . .'" (Tomlinson v. Qualcomm, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 944, citation omitted.)
It makes no difference that, under the employment application, Raghavan was "subject to . . . the policies and regulations of the company." Those policies and regulations did not give rise to an implied cont
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