Raghavan v. Boeing Co.10/31/2005
usly adjudicated is generally precluded if certain criteria are met." (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1247, italics omitted.)
As stated, BSS argued in its in limine motion that Raghavan should not be allowed "to relitigate issues which have already been fully litigated through Defendants' summary adjudication motion." But the amendments we have been discussing - mandating that summary adjudication motions dispose of "a cause or causes of action" instead of "issues," requiring that the grant of summary adjudication be deemed established at trial and that the remaining causes of action proceed unaffected, and stating that a summarily adjudicated cause of action shall not bar a remaining cause of action - express a unifying theme that summary adjudication shall have no preclusive effect during the subsequent trial. Yet, here, the trial court instructed the jury that the summary adjudication of the defamation cause of action established certain facts as to the wrongful termination cause of action.
In addition, the 1994 amendment prohibited the trial court, parties, and witnesses from making "comments" to the jury about the grant or denial of summary adjudication. In this case, the trial court believed it could instruct the jury about the supposed effect of the summary adjudication of the defamation cause of action as long as it did not use the words "summary adjudication," mention the statute (§ 437c), or refer to the motion for summary adjudication. We disagree. The trial court's approach exalted form over substance. (See Civ. Code, § 3528.) The 1994 amendment, like its predecessors, furthered the Legislature's goal that the summary adjudication of a cause of action would not affect the trial of a remaining cause of action.
We read the legislation's history to mean that the summary adjudication of "a cause of action" removes from the case "a separate theory of liability" (Catalano v. Superior Court, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 96) but has no bearing on how "the remaining causes of action" - the other theories of liability - are to be tried or proved. In short, the succession of amendments from 1990 to 1994 was intended "to stop the practice of piecemeal adjudication of facts that did not completely dispose of a substantive area." (Id. at p. 97.) At the same time, each cause of action, or substantive area, that is not summarily adjudicated is to stand on its own at trial.
BSS's authorities do not suggest to the contrary. For instance, in Conway v. Bughouse, Inc. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 194, the court discussed summary adjudication as permitted before the series of amendments beginning in 1990. (See id. at p. 202, quoting § 437c; see, e.g., Stats. 1980, ch. 57, § 1, p. 152; Stats. 1978, ch. 949, § 2, p. 2931; Stats. 1976, ch. 675, § 1, pp. 1664-1665; Stats. 1973, ch. 366, § 2, p. 808.)
And in St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, the court made the unremarkable observation: "Ordinarily, parties may not relitigate issues summarily adjudicated. . . . `If a motion for summary adjudication is granted, at the trial of the action, the cause or causes of action within the action, affirmative defense or defenses, claims for damages, or issue or issues of duty as to the motion which has been granted shall be deemed to be established and the action shall proceed as to the cause or causes of action, affirmative defense or defenses, claim for damages, or issue or issues of duty remaining.' . . . ` he policy behind summary adjudication motions "to `promote and protect the administration of justice, and to expedite litigation by the elimination of needless tr
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