Raghavan v. Boeing Co.10/31/2005
ns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 418-421.) The purpose of this amendment, as stated by the Legislature, was "to stop the practice of adjudication of facts or adjudication of issues that do not completely dispose of a cause of action or a defense." (Stats. 1990, ch. 1561, § 1, p. 7330, italics added.)
Two years later, the statute was amended to provide: "If a motion for summary adjudication is granted, at the trial of the action, the cause or causes of action within the action, affirmative defense or defenses, claim for damages, or issue or issues of duty as to the motion which has been granted shall be deemed to be established and the action shall proceed as to the cause or causes of action, affirmative defense or defenses, claim for damages, or issue or issues of duty remaining." (Stats. 1992, ch. 1348, § 1, p. 6702, italics added.) This provision has remained intact. (See § 437c, subd. (n)(1).)
An amendment in 1993 added: "In the trial of the action, the fact that a motion for summary adjudication is granted as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty within the action shall not operate to bar any cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty as to which summary adjudication was either not sought or denied." (Stats. 1993, ch. 276, § 1, p. 1973, italics added.) The statute has retained this provision. (See § 437c, subd. (n)(2).)
And in 1994, a new provision stated: "In the trial of an action, neither a party, nor a witness, nor the court shall comment upon the grant or denial of a motion for summary adjudication to a jury." (Stats. 1994, ch. 493, § 1, p. 2676, italics added; see also Stats. 1993, ch. 276, § 1, p. 1973.) This language has not been further amended. (See § 437c, subd. (n)(3).)
Thus, beginning in 1990, the Legislature narrowed the scope of the summary judgment statute and limited the effect of summary adjudication on the remaining causes of action. The most significant change was enacted in 1990, when the Legislature prohibited the summary adjudication of general "issues" and required instead that a summary adjudication motion dispose of one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty. As a result of the 1990 amendment, "facts" of any kind - undisputed, underlying, supporting, or subsidiary - were no longer subject to summary adjudication. (See Catalano v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 91, 96-97.) " he trial court's role in deciding a motion for summary [adjudication] involves no findings of fact." (Soto v. State of California (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 196, 199.)
In 1992, the Legislature made clear that a grant of summary adjudication as to a particular cause of action is deemed established at trial, but the case "proceed as to the . . . causes of action . . . remaining." As applied here, the grant of summary adjudication on the defamation cause of action was deemed established at trial, that is, the cause of action would not be tried. Defendants had prevailed on that cause of action. But nothing else was deemed established. The wrongful termination cause of action should have proceeded unaffected.
To further limit the effect of a grant of summary adjudication, the 1993 amendment provided that a summarily adjudicated cause of action shall not "bar" any of the remaining causes of action. This language is reminiscent of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. "` es judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy. . . . Under the collateral estoppel aspect of res judicata, relitigation of an issue previo
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