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Raghavan v. Boeing Co.10/31/2005
implied contract cause of action in defendants' favor.
3. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Raghavan argues that BSS violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in his employment agreement. Because Raghavan did not have a such an agreement - express or implied - his covenant cause of action fails. (See Agosta v. Astor, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 607; Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.)
B. Jury Instruction
Under the summary judgment statute (§ 437c), a trial court may not instruct the jury as to any "factual issue" because the trial court does not adjudicate such "issues." Rather, as in this case, the trial court may decide that a cause of action should be summarily adjudicated because there are no disputed facts and it lacks merit as a matter of law. At the trial on a remaining cause of action, the statute precludes the trial court from commenting upon the grant of summary adjudication, for example, by instructing the jury that certain "facts" are established.
In an in limine motion, BSS argued that the "undisputed facts" it presented in seeking summary adjudication on the defamation cause of action supported the conclusion that the accusation in the written reprimand was true and that, at trial, Raghavan should not be allowed to introduce evidence to the contrary or "relitigate" that issue before the jury. The trial court agreed and instructed the jury that the accusations were true, relying on the summary judgment statute as the basis for its ruling. As we read that statute, it precluded the jury instruction and did not restrict the type of evidence Raghavan could introduce at trial.
"`The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. . . .' . . . In determining that intent, we first examine the words of the statute itself. . . . Under the so-called `plain meaning' rule, courts seek to give the words employed by the Legislature their usual and ordinary meaning. . . . If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. . . . `"We must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." . . .'" (Bodell Construction Co. v. Trustees of Cal. State University (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1515-1516, citations omitted.)
As of 1989, the summary judgment statute permitted the summary adjudication of virtually any "issue" in a case, stating: "If it appears that the proof supports the granting of the motion for summary adjudication as to some but not all the issues involved in the action, or that one or more of the issues raised by a claim is admitted, or that one or more of the issues raised by a defense is conceded, the court shall, by order, specify that those issues are without substantial controversy. . . . At the trial of the action the issue so specified shall be deemed established and the action shall proceed as to the issues remaining." (Stats. 1989, ch. 1416, § 16, pp. 6229-6230, italics added; see Historical and Statutory Notes, 14C West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2004 ed.) foll. § 437c, pp. 280-281.)
In 1990, the statute was amended to limit - and still limits - summary adjudication motions to the disposition of one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty. (See Stats. 1990, ch. 1561, § 2, p. 7331; § 437c, subd. (f)(1); DeCastro West Chodorow & Bur
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