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Davila v. Nickell10/26/2005
missory note or was legally obligated to repay the note in the event of default by the signatories.
Moreover, even assuming the Control Agreement incorporated the promissory note and that Rodriguez became an obligor on the note, the record does not support that attorney fees incurred in this case are recoverable under the note terms. Rodriguez asserts that the document states that attorney fees are recoverable in actions to "'otherwise obtain judicial relief in connection with this note . . . .'" Even assuming this is the language in the promissory note (the note was not made a part of the appellate record), plaintiffs' tort claims in this case did not seek judicial relief "'in connection with'" the promissory note. They sought recovery for personal injury claims that have nothing to do with the promissory note. Thus, attorney fees are not permitted under the asserted terms of the note under Civil Code section 1717.
Rodriguez additionally seeks to uphold a portion of the attorney fee award because the court stated the attorney fee award included $20,000 in sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033, subdivision (o). We conclude this sanctions award was improper as a matter of law.
Code of Civil Procedure section 2033, subdivision (o) provides: "If a party fails to admit . . . the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this section, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves . . . the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees."
Rodriguez maintains that a sanction under this code section was proper because the judgment defendants failed to admit a request for admission propounded by plaintiffs that Joadd was the general contractor and employer of Davila and Barraza. However, under the express terms of Code of Civil Procedure section 2033, subdivision (o), only the "party requesting the admission" may recover sanctions for a wrongful denial. Rodriguez did not request that the judgment defendants admit to this fact. We find unavailing Rodriguez's arguments that we should broadly construe "party" under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033, subdivision (o) to include a co-defendant who is similarly situated as the propounding party and would benefit from the admission. Rodriguez's argument is not supported by the plain language of the statute. Unless ambiguous, we must give statutory terms their plain meanings. (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.)
C. Prejudgment Interest Award
The Louies next contend the court erred in awarding $2.2 million in prejudgment interest based on the Davila plaintiffs' settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 (section 998).
Before trial, the Davila plaintiffs (children and parents) made a joint section 998 offer to settle with Mr. Louie for $750,000, and a joint section 998 offer to settle with Mrs. Louie for $750,000. The Louies rejected this offer. Thereafter, the compensatory verdicts for each Davila plaintiff exceeded this amount, totaling $4.25 million ($900,000 for each Davila parent and $816,667 for each of the Davila children). The Davila plaintiffs then moved for prejudgment interest under section 998 and Civil Code section 3291 in the amount of $2.2 million. This amount was calculated based on the interest on the Davila plaintiffs' total compensatory verdict amount ($4.25 million) from the date of the offer.
Civil Code section 3291 provides that "if the plaintiff makes an offer pursuant to Section 998 . . . which the def
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