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Davila v. Nickell10/26/2005
e award to Kuiper based on Kuiper's conduct in causing the injuries that Barraza sustained as a result of the fall. However, the Louies acknowledge that Kuiper played little or no role in causing these injuries. Thus, it is fair that the Louies should be barred from shifting any more than $500,000 of their liability to Kuiper. However, to the extent that the Louies can establish Kuiper is liable because he caused injuries directly to the Louies arising from an independent duty Kuiper owed to the Louies, this claim would not be barred by the Kuiper's settlement with Barraza because it is not based on the plaintiffs' injuries. Instead, it is based on an alleged independent duty owed to the Louies that was breached by Kuiper. A claim for breach of this duty is not a claim seeking to shift responsibility between joint tortfeasors, and thus it is not barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.
3. Good Faith Settlement Amount
For similar reasons we reject the Louies' alternative argument that the court abused its discretion in determining the $500,000 payment is "in the Tech-Bilt ballpark." (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488.) Tech-Bilt held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, a trial court should consider, among other factors, whether the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the settlor's proportionate share of liability. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500.) Thus, a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-...-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury. (Id. at p. 499.)
As explained above, the $500,000 was easily within the "reasonable range" of Kuiper's "proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries." (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500, italics added.) The $500,000 was a fair amount given the lack of Kuiper's culpability for the plaintiffs' injuries, particularly when compared to the conduct of the other defendants who were found to have acted with malice, oppression, and fraud in failing to supply necessary safety equipment. As the Louies recognize, it would be "absurd" to say Kuiper shared any equivalent responsibility for the accident merely because he issued an insurance certificate. Moreover, had Barraza actually tried this case, it is doubtful he could have established duty or causation or withstood a statute of limitations defense.
VI. Attorney Fees, Sanctions, and Prejudgment Interest Award
A. Attorney Fees to Plaintiffs
After the jury returned its verdicts, plaintiffs sought attorney fees under section 3709, which permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing employee in a personal injury action against an employer who failed to secure workers' compensation insurance. In support, they submitted declarations showing they had entered into contingency agreements in which they agreed to pay their attorneys 40 percent of the overall judgment (except for the one Davila child who was still a minor, who agreed to pay 33 percent). After a hearing, the court awarded plaintiffs $2.5 million in attorney fees.
The Louies contend section 3709 is inapplicable because Barraza and Davila came within the section 3351(d) and 3352(h) categories, and therefore no workers' compensation coverage was required. Because we have rejected those arguments (see ante at Discussion Section I), we reject the challenge to the attorney fees award on the same basis.
The Louies alternatively argue the attorney
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