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Davila v. Nickell10/26/2005
t "receive evidence and conduct a hearing to determine whether the settling party is a joint tortfeasor . . . ." The Louies do not cite any supporting authority for this contention, which is inconsistent with the express statutory language. Moreover, the Louies' contention is contrary to the public policy underlying the good faith statutes. A defendant settles claims before liability is resolved to avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty of a trial. To read into Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 a requirement that a court must make a factual determination whether an alleged joint tortfeasor was a joint tortfeasor before making the good faith determination would defeat the statutory goals: to encourage settlement without a trial and provide for equitable allocation of fault among alleged joint tortfeasors. (See Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 810.)
2. "Before Verdict or Judgment" Clause
The Louies alternatively argue the court erred in applying the good faith settlement statutes because the Kuiper settlement occurred after the jury verdict against Kuiper's co-defendants. Code of Civil Procedure section 877 permits a good faith determination " here a release dismissal . . . is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort . . . ." (Italics added.)
The Louies argue the "before verdict or judgment" phrase means the settlement must occur before the verdict or judgment is rendered against the non-settling joint tortfeasors. In support, the Louies rely on Be v. Western Truck Exchange (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1139 (Be). Kuiper counters that the "before verdict or judgment" phrase refers to the settling defendant, and in this case Kuiper did settle before a verdict was returned on the claims asserted against him. In support, Kuiper relies on Price Pfister, Inc. v. William Lyon Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1643 (Price Pfister).
The statutes do not make clear whether the "before verdict or judgment" phrase refers to the settling or non-settling defendant. Moreover, on our review of the Be and Price Pfister decisions, neither decision addresses the specific issue raised in this case. Price Pfister concerned a settlement that occurred between the liability and damages phase. (Price Pfister, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1646-1649.) Be involved a settlement that occurred after final judgment was entered when there was no possibility of any further trial between the plaintiff and the settling defendant. (Be, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 1144.) In this case, the issue is whether the statutory protections apply when a trial is bifurcated to resolve the plaintiffs' claims against some of the defendants alleged to be joint tortfeasors in an initial phase, and then after the verdict, the plaintiff settles with the remaining party also alleged to be responsible in tort for the same injuries.
Despite the lack of clear statutory or decisional authority, we find the practical answer to the issue raised here is quite simple-the court did not prejudicially err in concluding the good faith settlement statutory provisions apply under the facts of this case. In taking this practical approach, we are mindful that " he Legislature intended the 'good faith' concept to be 'a flexible principle imposing on reviewing courts the obligation to guard against the numerous ways in which the interests of non-settling defendants may be unfairly prejudiced.'" (Price Pfister, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1648.) Allowing Kuiper to rely on the good faith settlement provisions to discharge himself from liability for contribution or comparative indemnity for plaintiffs' injuries was fair and su
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