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Arvest Bank Group v. Beckman11/2/2005
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
This appeal comes from a decision of the Arkansas Worker's Compensation Commission (Commission) to apportion liability for the payment of benefits equally between two separate insurance carriers. Clarendon National Insurance (Clarendon) provided coverage for Arvest Bank Group (Arvest) when appellee Laurie Beckman was first diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in 2002, and after accepting her injury as compensable, paid medical and temporary total disability benefits. Appellant Royal & Sun Alliance became the insurance carrier for Arvest on July 1, 2002. Later in December 2002, Beckman's treating physician evaluated her, found her without permanent impairment, and released her to resume her duties full-time at Arvest.
Beckman gradually began to experience problems associated with carpal tunnel syndrome, and after being denied access to her treating physician, she sought treatment from her family physician who subsequently performed carpal-tunnel release surgery on April 23, 2004. Beckman then filed a claim for medical treatment and temporary total disability. The Commission found that Beckman's carpal tunnel syndrome and a surgery in 2004 was the result of the combined effects of the initial compensable injuries occurring in 2002 while Clarendon was the insurance carrier, and a subsequent aggravation occurring later when the appellant was the insurance carrier. Accordingly, the Commission apportioned liability benefits equally between the two carriers. The appellant contends that the Commission's determination that Beckman sustained an aggravation of her compensable injury-rather than a recurrence-was without substantial evidence. We affirm.
When reviewing a decision of the Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission, and we affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Campbell v. Randal Tyler Ford Mercury Inc., 70 Ark. App. 35, 13 S.W.3d 916 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mays v. Alumnitec, Inc., 76 Ark. App. 274, 64 S.W.3d 772 (2001). We will not reverse the Commission's decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999). In making our review, we recognize that it is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts, 74 Ark. App. 428, 58 S.W.3d 853 (2001). Furthermore, the Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence and, if the evidence is conflicting, its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. Green Bay Packaging v. Bartlett, 67 Ark. App. 332, 999 S.W.2d 695 (1999).
The appellant argues that the Commission erred in finding that Beckman's injuries and medical treatment occurring after appellant began providing insurance coverage for Arvest was the result of an aggravation. The appellant instead contends that this injury was a recurrence of Beckman's previous compensable injury, and therefore the insurance carrier at the time of the previous injury-Clarendon-is still liable for Beckman's claims.
A recurrence is not a new injury but merely another period of incapacitation resulting from a previous injury. Atkins Nursing Home v. Gary, 54 Ark. App. 125, 923 S.W.2d 897 (1996). A recurrence exists when the second complication is a natural and probable consequence of a prior injury. Weldon v. Pierce Bros. Constr., 54 Ark.
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