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Gist v. Sanyo Manufacturing Corp.11/16/2005
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appellant Revertis Gist sustained an electric-shock injury while working for appellee Sanyo Manufacturing Corporation on October 2, 2002. Sanyo accepted the injury as compensable and paid for treatment provided by Drs. Sudhir Kumar and Michael DeShazo. The Workers' Compensation Commission authorized a change of physician to Dr. Charles Schultz, and Sanyo initially covered the medical expenses associated with Dr. Schultz's diagnosis and treatment. However, Sanyo subsequently discontinued payment pursuant to its contention that the treatment being provided by Dr. Schultz was not reasonably necessary in connection with Ms. Gist's compensable injury. Ms. Gist brought a claim seeking entitlement to ongoing treatment prescribed by Dr. Schultz, but the Workers' Compensation Commission denied her claim. The Commission's decision was based in part on its conclusion that Dr. Schultz's opinion addressing compensability of the continuing treatment was not stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty as required by Ark. Code Ann. ยง 11-9-102(16)(B) (Repl. 2002). Ms. Gist now appeals.
For reversal of the Commission's decision, Ms. Gist argues that the Commission erred as a matter of law in requiring Dr. Schultz's opinion to be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, citing the fact that Sanyo had previously stipulated that she sustained a compensable injury. Ms. Gist further asserts that, even if there were such a requirement, it was met because Dr. Schultz testified that her condition was probably related to the work injury. Finally, Ms. Gist contends that considering all of the evidence presented, substantial evidence does not support the Commission's decision that she is not entitled to additional treatment. We find no error and affirm.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 2002) provides: The employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical, surgical, hospital, chiropractic, optometric, podiatric, and nursing services and medicine, crutches, ambulatory devices, artificial limbs, eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, and other apparatus as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.
What constitutes reasonable and necessary treatment under this section is a fact question for the Commission. Arkansas Dep't of Correction v. Holybee, 46 Ark. App. 232, 878 S.W.2d 420 (1994).
When the Commission denies a claim because of the claimant's failure to meet her burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm the Commission's decision if its opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Dalton v. Allen Eng'g Co., 66 Ark. App. 201, 989 S.W.2d 543 (1999). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. City of Fort Smith v. Brooks, 40 Ark. App. 120, 842 S.W.2d 463 (1992). A decision by the Workers' Compensation Commission should not be reversed unless it is clear that fair-minded person could not have reached the same conclusions if presented with the same facts. Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, 10 Ark. App. 28, 661 S.W.2d 403 (1983).
Ms. Gist testified on her own behalf at the hearing. She stated that she is fifty-nine years old and worked for Sanyo for twenty-nine years. She described the electric-shock injury as follows:
In October of 2002, when my accident happened, we had just gotten back from a break and I had put on my gloves and had put on about 10 backs of TVs when I put my hand on the cord to secure it to the back and that's when it just looked like it blew up. It popped real loud and [there was] a big
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