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ERVEY v. NORTHEASTERN LOG HOMES2/28/1994
Richard Ervey appeals from a Workers' Compensation Board decision to nullify an unappealed 1986 decree of the Workers' Compensation Commission. Ervey asserts that the Commission's decision was not clearly erroneous and that, even if it were erroneous, the 1986 decision was final and was not subject to collateral attack. Northeastern Log Homes, Inc. counters that the 1986 decree awarded compensation to the employee to which he was never entitled pursuant to 39 M.R.S.A. § 55 repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 559, § B (effective Nov. 20, 1987) and therefore the 1986 decree was void when issued in 1986 and the Board did not err in its 1993 decision to declare it so. We hold that the Commission's 1986 decree was final and valid, and
The parties stipulated to the following facts: Ervey suffered a number of compensable injuries; relevant to the matter at hand is a compensable injury sustained by Ervey in 1972 while he was employed by Northeastern. In 1986, the Commission ordered Northeastern and its insurer to pay 33% of lost earnings incurred by Ervey from 1975 to 1980 and to pay 25% partial incapacity from 1980 to the present and continuing indefinitely. Although Ervey also suffered a compensable injury in 1969 while working for Allen Electric Company, the Commission's 1986 decision noted that Allen Electric was not liable for any portion of the partial incapacity because, at the time of that injury, an Employer's liability for partial incapacity was limited to 300 weeks. The 1986 decision was never appealed. Nevertheless, in 1993, in response to Northeastern's "Petition to Terminate Commission Order Relative to a December 18, 1972 Injury," the Board held that the Commission's 1986 decree was null and void "as the Commission had no authority to require Northeastern Log Homes to pay Ervey benefits at that time." Ervey appeals.
At the time of Ervey's December 1972 injury, 39 M.R.S.A. § 55 provided that:
hile the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is
partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly
compensation . . . and in no case shall the period covered by
such compensation be greater than 325 weeks from the date of
the accident except for vocational rehabilitation services
provided under sections 52 and 54.
Northeastern argues that the Commission improperly granted partial incapacity benefits beyond the statutory 325-week period, and thus, its decision was void. Ervey contends that the Commission's decision, if final, was merely an error of law and thus may be "voidable" but is not "void."
"It is well established that a valid judgment entered by a court, if not appealed from, generally becomes res judicata and is not subject to later collateral attack." Standish Tel. Co. v. Saco River Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 A.2d 478, 481 (Me. 1989). We have recognized "a strong policy in favor of ending litigation and giving finality to court judgments." Id. Balanced against a policy favoring finality, however, is a requirement that in order to become final, a judgment must be valid. Id.
We have repeatedly applied res judicata principles to decisions rendered by the administrative tribunals of the Workers Compensation system. E.g., Crawford v. Allied Container Corp., 561 A.2d 1027, 1028-29 (Me. 1989); Dillingham v. Andover Wood Products, 483 A.2d 1232, 1234-35 (Me. 1984); Canning v. State, 444 A.2d 387, 389-91 (Me. 1982); Leo v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 438 A.2d 917, 925 (Me. 1981); Wentzell v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Me. 1980); Comer v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 163 A. 269, 270 (Me. 1932); Graney's Case, 124 A. 204 (Me. 1924); see Wentworth v. Manpower Temporary Services, 589 A.2d 934, 937-38 (Me.
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