CLARK v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.3/2/1994
In each of these cases, the Workers' Compensation Board dismissed the employee's petition for permanent impairment benefits on condition that the employee could reinstate the petition if the Board's Rule 1.4(A) were invalidated. The employers appeal, contending that the petitions should have been unconditionally dismissed and that Rule 1.4(A) violates the current Workers' Compensation Act. Because the Board is without authority to fashion this conditional dismissal, we vacate the condition.
The current Workers' Compensation Act was enacted in the fall of 1992 and became effective January 1, 1993. P.L. 1991, ch. 885. The 1993 Act substantially altered benefits for injuries occurring after that date. Concerned that the Act might apply to all petitions filed after January 1, 1993, even though the injury pre-dated the Act, thousands of workers filed petitions for permanent impairment benefits under the old Act in December of 1992. In response to these filings, the Workers' Compensation Board adopted Rule 1.4(A) which states " etermination of the employee's right to receipt of payment for permanent impairment benefits shall be governed by the law in effect at the time of the employee's injury." The Board then dismissed the petitions in these cases with the proviso that should Rule 1.4(A) "be invalidated at some time in the future, or be found not to apply to the employee's case, then the pending petition will be reinstated with its original December, 1992 filing date." The employers appeal from the conditional dismissals, arguing that the Board acted beyond its authority and that Rule 1.4(A) violates the Act.
Initially, the employers argue that by conditionally dismissing the petitions, the Board improperly exercised an equity power. We agree that the Board has no general power in equity, and has "only such authority as is conferred upon it by express legislative grant or such as arises therefrom by implication as incidental to full and complete exercise of the powers granted." Hird v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 512 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1986) (citing Wentzell v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Me. 1980)). Because there is no express grant of power to dismiss petitions on the condition presented here, and because that power is neither necessary nor incidental to the exercise of any express power, the Board acted beyond its authority.
Although our inquiry could end here, in the interests of judicial economy we proceed to determine the important issue that has been fully briefed and argued whether permanent impairment benefits remain available under the current Act for injuries that pre-date the Act.
The legislature included the following provision to govern the transition from the old version of the Act to the new:
So as not to alter benefits for injuries incurred before
January 1, 1993, for matters in which the injury occurred prior
to that date, all the provisions of this Act apply, except that
the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 39-A, sections 211, 212, 213,
214, 215, 221, 306, and 325 do not apply. With regard to
matters in which the injury occurred prior to January 1, 1993,
the applicable provisions of former Title 39 apply in place of
Title 39-A, sections 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 221, 306 and
325.
P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-10. The permanent impairment sections of the old Act were found in 39 M.R.S.A. § 56, repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 559 § 31 (effective Nov. 20, 1987), 39 M.R.S.A. § 56-A, repealed by P.L. 1987, ch. 559 § 32 (effective Nov. 20, 1987), and 39 M.R.S.A. § 56-B, repealed by P.L. 1991, ch. 885, § A-7 (effective Jan. 1, 1993). The issue here is whether sections 56, 56-A and 56-B are applicable in place
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