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Fair Meadows v. Ward9/30/1997
SUSTAINED
In this case, the issue is whether respondent, which failed to appear at a scheduled trial, can move to vacate a workers' compensation award nearly three years later, on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that there is no authority for the Workers' Compensation Court to consider such a motion.
Respondent Roger D. Ward was injured when a horse he was riding in a schooling race at Petitioner Fair Meadows track bucked him off and another horse ran over him. Ward filed a Form 3 September 4, 1992 in the Workers' Compensation Court naming Fair Meadows as his employer. Fair Meadows and its insurance carrier were served, but neither responded, except Fair Meadows filed an unsworn letter disclaiming the employment relationship. Neither Fair Meadows nor the insurance carrier appeared at the October 8, 1993 trial at which Ward testified that he was told to ride a certain horse in the schooling race and was paid by Fair Meadows to do this. He presented evidence of employment through his testimony and copies of checks issued him by Fair Meadows. The trial court, by order filed October 20, 1993, found it had jurisdiction and further found Ward temporarily totally disabled and permanently partially disabled due to his head and neck injuries.
On October 18, 1996, Fair Meadows moved to vacate the judgment on the grounds that it was irregularly obtained in that the court lacked jurisdiction. The motion to vacate was denied.
The record reveals that notice of the trial was sent by certified mail to Fair Meadows and that Fair Meadows was called three times in open court, but failed to appear. The order on the merits was filed and sent to Fair Meadows October 20, 1993. While Fair Meadows attacks the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Court to enter the original judgment, our first task is to determine whether the Workers' Compensation Court, and subsequently this Court, had jurisdiction to consider Fair Meadows' motion to vacate. It has long been the rule that there "is no method provided by statute whereby a final order of the Industrial Commission may be set aside after time for appeal has expired; and the commission is invested with no equitable powers sufficient to authorize investigation of the validity of its final orders." Gibbins v. Indian Electric Cooperative, 203 Okla. 187, 219 P.2d 634, 635 (1950). Only two procedures were recognized in Gibbins to review a final order of the Workers' Compensation Court. The first was a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The second was an equitable filing in a court of general jurisdiction where the allegation is that the award was procured by means of extrinsic fraud. Id.
There are now two additional procedures to review an award: a 20 day period during which the Workers' Compensation Court may vacate or modify its judgments, and an appeal to the court en banc. "The State Industrial court has jurisdiction to review its award or decision upon its own motion or upon the application of any party affected and to vacate and set aside a default judgment at any time within 20 days after a copy of the award or decision has been sent by said court to the affected party." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Heller, 1965 OK ____, 401 P.2d 184 (syllabus by the court). Time for appeal in workers' compensation cases is within ten days to the court en banc, or within twenty days to the Supreme Court. 85 O.S. 1991 Section 3.6(A) and (C).
The Supreme Court has been consistent in its description of review options. One who is aggrieved by a decision of the trial Judge of the Workers' Compensation Court has three available remedies: (a) he can appeal to a three-Judge review pan
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