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Stivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.12/31/1997
Workers' compensation * Employee assaulted and injured by fellow employee at restaurant near workplace * Injury not compensable when not sustained "in the course of" employment.
Submitted September 10, 1997
After finishing a shift at the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ("Goodyear") plant, appellant, Richard Stivison, stopped at a nearby restaurant where he was assaulted and injured by his fellow Goodyear employee Jeff McCormick. The impetus for the assault was a grudge McCormick bore against Stivison for informing their supervisor that McCormick had been leaving work early, an infraction of Goodyear's rules.
Stivison filed a workers' compensation claim for the injuries sustained in the assault. Goodyear opposed the allowance of the claim. Although the district hearing officer agreed with Goodyear, the regional board of review allowed the claim on appeal, and the Industrial Commission affirmed. Goodyear then appealed the commission's order to common pleas court and both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgement to Goodyear and the appellate court affirmed.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
The issue in this case is whether Stivison's broken nose and arm qualify as injuries "received in the course of, and arising out of," his employment.
For the purposes of workers' compensation, R.C. 4123.01(C) defines an "injury" as "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment."
In Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 551 N.E.2d 1271, we reaffirmed our interpretation of "in the course of" as involving the time, place, and circumstances of the injury and "arising out of" as involving causal connection between the injury and the injured person's employment. Id. at 277-278, 551 N.E.2d at 1274. We also "expressly recognize the conjunctive nature of the coverage formula of `in the course of and arising out of' the employment. * * * ll elements of the formula must be met before compensation will be allowed." Id. at 277, 551 N.E.2d at 1274. Stivison argues that his injury is compensable solely because of a causal connection with his employment. This argument ignores half of the coverage formula recognized in Fisher by failing to acknowledge the necessity for temporal, spatial, and circumstantial connection.
The assault which injured Stivison occurred neither during his working hours, nor at his place of employment, nor while he was fulfilling his working duties. Stivison's injuries were, therefore, not sustained "in the course of" his employment, as that phrase is interpreted by Ohio law. Accordingly, summary judgement in favor of Goodyear was properly granted on this element alone, because, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Stivison, reasonable minds could only conclude that the claimant here could not show that he met all the elements of the Fisher coverage formula.
Not only does Stivison's claim fall outside the limits of "course of employment," but also his claim is disqualified by the requirement of causal connection in the phrase "arising out of employment." Many uncompensable injuries can be said to bear some causal relation to employment, but legal analysis must focus upon the nature and degree of causal connection. Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 266, Section 41. The totality of the circumstances test set forth in Lord v. Daugherty (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 441, 20 O.O.3d 376, 423 N.E.2d 96, supplies the necessary standard for determining sufficiency of c
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