 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
SMITH v. YANKEE CONST. CORP.5/28/1993
The third-party defendant, Concrete Craftsmen Corporation, appeals from an order entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Mead, J.) denying its motion for a summary judgment based on its claim of immunity from suit under the Workers' Compensation Act. Because we conclude that Concrete Craftsmen did not clearly and specifically waive its immunity under the Act, we direct the entry of a summary judgment in its favor.
Yankee Construction Corporation was hired by Patten Construction Company, Inc., the general contractor on the Portsmouth Regional Medical Center construction project, to perform all concrete work at the construction site in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Yankee in turn subcontracted with Concrete Craftsmen to pour the concrete floors at the construction site. Thereafter, George Smith, an employee of Concrete Craftsmen, was injured while working at the construction site. Concrete Craftsmen's workers' compensation insurance carrier paid workers' compensation benefits to Smith for his injuries.
George and Margo Smith commenced this action against Patten, Yankee, and H.C.A. Realty, Inc., the owner of the construction site, seeking to recover for personal injuries sustained by Smith. Yankee brought a third-party action against Concrete Craftsmen seeking indemnification. Concrete Craftsmen then filed a motion for a summary judgment on the ground that it is immune from Yankee's third-party suit pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, which provides that " n employer who has secured the payment of compensation . . . is exempt from civil actions . . . involving personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of employment." 39 M.R.S.A. ยง 4 (Supp.
1992). Concrete Craftsmen has appealed from the court's denial of its motion.
We must first determine whether the denial of Concrete Craftsmen's motion for a summary judgment is immediately appealable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. In different contexts, we have held that the denial of a motion for a summary judgment based on a claim of immunity from suit is immediately appealable under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. See Ryan v. City of Augusta, 622 A.2d 74, 75 (Me. 1993) (qualified immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 suit); Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 412-13 (Me. 1990) (discretionary function immunity under Maine Tort Claims Act). In so holding, we recognized that the immunity in question was an entitlement to immunity from suit rather than a defense to liability, and it "`is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.'" Lord v. Murphy, 561 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Me. 1989) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). Contrary to Yankee's contention, section 4 of the Act confers immunity from suit, rather than merely immunity from liability, on employers such as Concrete Craftsmen. Accordingly, we address the merits of the issues presented on appeal.
Yankee contends that Concrete Craftsmen waived its immunity under the Act and is therefore not entitled to a summary judgment. We disagree. Because the "intent of the statute was not to burden the industries of the State beyond the scope of the act as defined by the lawmakers," Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43, 49 (Me. 1969), we have set forth strict requirements for a valid waiver of an employer's immunity by an indemnification agreement. In Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Sullivan & Merritt, Inc., 493 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1985), we stated that such an indemnity clause
"is enforceable only if it clearly and specifically contains a
waiver of the immunity of the
Page 1 2 Maine Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|