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STUART v. DOUGLAS COUNTY12/15/1995
Douglas County appeals an order of the Workers Compensation Board (Board) ruling that Carole Stuart suffered a 65% permanent partial general disability as a result of an accident while working as a secretary for the Douglas County District Attorney. The County also appeals the ruling that Stuart was an employee of the County and not the State for workers compensation purposes.
We affirm.
While at work, Stuart struck her left elbow on a door and was eventually diagnosed with "tennis elbow" and reflex sympathetic dystrophy. The administrative law judge found Stuart suffered a 65% permanent partial general disability and ruled Stuart was an employee of the State. The Board upheld the disability rating, but ruled Stuart was an employee of the County, not of the State.
For the most part, this is not a fact-driven case.
The County first argues the current Workers Compensation Act is unconstitutional because it calls for review of the administrative law judge's ruling by the Board rather than a de novo review by a district court. This, claims the County, violates its right of access to the courts> and a "remedy by due course of law." Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 18.
Appellees argue that the constitution does not require review by a district court, but only requires a fair hearing with due process before a tribunal having jurisdiction. We agree.
On appeal, we must presume the challenged statute is constitutional and must resolve all doubts in favor of the statute's constitutional validity. Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 251 Kan. 240, 243, 834 P.2d 368 (1992).
"`Remedy by due course of law,' as used in § 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights, means the reparation for injury ordered by a tribunal having jurisdiction in due course of procedure after a fair hearing. [Citation omitted.] Remedy by due course of law is tied to due process concerns." In re Marriage of Soden, 251 Kan. 225, 233, 834 P.2d 358, cert. denied 121 L.Ed.2d 540 (1992).
We feel the Soden rationale is applicable. The County does not claim it was denied a full and fair hearing before the administrative law judge. Like the appellant in Soden, the County received notice, a reasonable hearing, and judicial review. The County is merely hoping that a different factfinder might decide the case in its favor. The legislature did provide a viable statutory remedy as an adequate substitute or quid pro quo for the loss of some common-law remedies for injured employees. See Rajala v. Doresky, 233 Kan. 440, 661 P.2d 1251 (1983).
Further, under Kan. Const. art. 3, § 6(b), the legislature has the power to determine the jurisdiction of the district courts>. And see In re K-Mart Corp., 232 Kan. 387, Syl. 3, 654 P.2d 470 (1982).
The Workers Compensation Act is constitutional.
The County next argues the Board had no jurisdiction when it never transferred the case to district court as directed by Sedlak v. Dick, 256 Kan. 779, 887 P.2d 1119 (1995). However, remedial legislation was quickly passed to cure the constitutional problems discussed in Sedlak. Concerning what should happen with cases already pending, the legislation provided:
"New Sec. 5. (a) Any workers compensation appeals which have been transferred from the workers compensation board to a district court or the director of workers compensation pursuant to the Kansas Supreme Court's order in Sedlak v. Dick, case no. 70,792 (January 13, 1995) and have not been decided by the director or the district courts> shall be transferred to the workers compensation
board established under section 1
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