Alba v. Sampson2/24/1998
Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Libel and Slander. Contract, Interference with contractual relations. Malice. Employment, Termination.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 27, 1992.
The case was heard by Herman J. Smith, Jr., J., on a motion for summary judgment.
For approximately five years, the Interactive Data Corporation (IDC) employed the plaintiff, Wayne Alba, as an accountant. In January, 1992, IDC laid off Alba as part of a company-wide reduction in force. Following his lay-off, Alba sued IDC and Christine Sampson, an employee of superior rank who was not in his chain of command, claiming that Sampson defamed him and maliciously induced IDC to terminate his employment. A Judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
When a defendant demonstrates that the plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his case, summary judgment properly may be granted. See Colley v. Benson, Young & Downs Ins. Agency, Inc., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 527, 529 (1997). In reviewing the allowance of a defendant's motion for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 528. "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Lyon v. Morphew, 424 Mass. 828, 831 (1997), quoting from Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711 (1991).
1. Defamation.
The plaintiff has waived all defamation claims against Sampson with the exception of his claim arising from the so-called "bumper sticker" incident. That incident involved a disgruntled, former IDC employee posting bumper stickers all over the employee parking garage that stated "Chris Sampson is a fat loser." After seeing the stickers, Sampson confronted Alba in his office, hysterical, with tears in her eyes, screamed "You fucking asshole. What do you think you're doing? You're going to jail. I'm going to get you for that." After reviewing surveillance tapes which revealed that a former employee was responsible for the incident, Sampson apologized to the plaintiff. Additional facts pertaining to this incident will be discussed as the need arises.
Summary judgments are favored in defamation cases. See Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410 Mass. 631, 632 (1991). Generally, spoken words are not actionable per se without proof of special damages, which consist of economic, as distinguished from general, damages. See Lynch v. Lyons, 303 Mass. 116, 118-119 (1939). Here, the plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of proving special damages, an essential element of his case.
Conceding that he has failed to allege any facts tending to show special damages, the plaintiff claims that Sampson's slander was actionable per se without proof of special damages because it fell within the narrow exception for slander which "prejudice him in his office, profession or business or may probably tend to do so." Lynch v. Lyons, supra at 119. See also Morrill v. Crawford, 278 Mass. 250, 256 (1932). We disagree.
The instant case is governed in material respects by Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337 (1943). There, in a case that involved a manager who stated at a staff meeting that it was "a disgrace" to have the plaintiff in the office, the court held that the comments were not, as matter of law, slander per se "affecting the plaintiff in his trade or profession." Id. at 345-346. The court reasoned that disgrace was a word of general disparagement "equally discreditable as applied to all persons and not peculiarly harmful in a financial way to insurance agent
Page 1 2 3 4 Massachusetts Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|