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City of Dallas v. King6/26/1998
On Appeal from the 298th District CourtDallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 93-01946-M
This is an appeal of a summary judgment. In a single point of error, City of Dallas (the City) contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees because the City pleaded a valid cause of action for conversion. Because we conclude appellees never exercised dominion and control over the property in question, we affirm.
FACTS
Gregory Ford, an employee of the City, suffered injuries when Hollis Lee Minter , an employee of Henry C. Beck Company, Inc. (Beck) and HCB Contractors, Ltd. (HCB), struck the car Ford was driving. As a result of the injury, the City paid workers' compensation benefits to Ford. Ford sued Minter, Beck, and HCB, who tendered the lawsuit to their insurer, The St. Paul Insurance Company (St. Paul). The parties settled the lawsuit, and St. Paul issued a settlement check to Ford's attorney, with the agreement that Ford's attorney would handle the City's workers' compensation lien. After failing to negotiate an agreement with the City, Ford's attorney released the settlement proceeds to Ford. The City then sued Minter, Beck, HCB, St. Paul, and Dru King, the St. Paul claims representative in charge of Ford's file, alleging conversion of its workers' compensation lien, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and violations of Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code. Appellees moved for summary judgment on all causes of action, claiming that the City failed to plead a cause of action for conversion. The City conceded all legal issues, except those pertaining to its cause of action for conversion. The trial court, however, agreed with appellees and granted summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standards for reviewing a summary judgment are well established:
(1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). A defendant who moves for summary judgment must show that the plaintiff has no cause of action. A defendant may meet this burden by either (1) disproving at least one essential element of each theory of recovery or (2) conclusively proving all elements of an affirmative defense. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d. 732, 733 (Tex. 1993).
CONVERSION
In its single point of error, the City contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for appellees because the City pleaded a valid cause of action for conversion. The City contends appellees wrongfully paid out settlement money belonging to the City when they had actual knowledge of the City's statutory lien against the workers' compensation benefits paid to Ford. Specifically, the City argues that when an employer pays workers' compensation benefits to an injured employee, the employer is entitled to recover, as reimbursement of its lien, the "first money" paid to that employee by a third-party tortfeasor. See former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8307, Section 6a (Vernon 1967), repealed by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 1, Section 16.01(10) to (12). The City contends that because appellees paid out the "first money" to Ford's attorney, and not to the City, appellees are guilty of conversion. We disagree.
Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion an
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