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Divittorio v. Industrial Commission9/29/1998
with employer's assertions and find them meritless.
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature." Robbins v. Board of Trustees of the Carbondale Police Pension Fund, 177 Ill. 2d 533, 539 (1997). The court should seek the legislative intent primarily from the statute's language. Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d at 539. "Where the language of the act is certain and unambiguous the only legitimate function of the courts is to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature." Robbins, 177 Ill. 2d at 539.
Although employer's arguments might have had merit before 1975, such is no longer the case. Before the 1975 amendment to section 8(e)(19), it read as follows:
"19. In a case of specific loss other than by amputation under the provisions of this paragraph the amount of which loss has been determined in proceedings before the Commission or an Arbitrator thereof under the provisions of this Act, or in a case of specific loss by amputation under the provisions of this paragraph, and the subsequent death of such injured employee from other causes than such injury leaving a widow or lineal dependents or both surviving before payment in full for such injury, then the balance remaining due for such injury is payable to such dependents, in the proportion which such dependency bears to total dependency." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.8(e)(19).
See also Pub. Act 79-79, 1975 Ill. Laws 224, 257. At present, section 8(e)(19) reads:
"19. In a case of specific loss and the subsequent death of such injured employee from other causes than such injury leaving a widow, widower, or dependents surviving before payment or payment in full for such injury, then the amount due for such injury is payable to the widow or widower and, if there be no widow or widower, then to such dependents, in the proportion which such dependency bears to total dependency. 820 ILCS 305/8(e)(19) (West 1996).
We find that the clear and unambiguous language of the present version of section 8(e)(19) does not prevent the substitution of parties before arbitration proceedings have commenced. If the General Assembly intended to do such, it easily could have added language requiring arbitration hearings to be complete or at least in progress before substitution is allowed. Instead, the language of section 8(e)(19) plainly allows substitution anytime before the worker has been fully compensated for the injury. 820 ILCS 305/8(e)(19) (West 1996). Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, both the legislative history and a Governor's message regarding a related amendment further confirm that substitution is allowed before proceedings have commenced. Senator Knuppel asserted that the purpose of the legislation is to entitle decedent's estate or heirs to receive the benefits that the employee would have otherwise received had the "matter gone to a full and complete hearing." 79th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 21, 1975, at 107. Furthermore, a message by Governor Daniel Walker regarding Senate Bill 473 intimates that the 1975 amendment to section 8(e)(19) (contained in Senate Bill 235) was designed to allow heirs and dependents to pursue a deceased worker's benefits even in circumstances where the worker died before filing for such benefits. 1975 Ill. Laws Governor's message, at 2357-58 (stating that Senate Bill 473 allows heirs and dependents to collect a deceased worker's benefits even though the worker dies before filing for the benefits and that "Senate Bill 473 * should be read in a manner which makes it consistent with Senate Bill 235").
Nonetheless, employer urge
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