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Tracy v. Hershey Creamery Company11/23/1998 See also Bureau v. Staffing Network, Inc., 678 A.2d 583, 588 (Me. 1996) (interpreting title 39-A in light of longstanding judicial interpretations of similar provisions in former title 39). Accordingly, the determination as to whether an employee's loss of vision exceeds 80% for purposes of Paragraph 212(3)(M) should be made when the work-related condition has reached a reasonable medical endpoint. Here, Tracy's vision was restored to less than 80% loss within approximately 6 months of the injury.
We next address Tracy's contention that his ongoing vision loss even after medical intervention triggers the employer's responsibility to pay specific loss benefits because the implanted lens is analogous to glasses, and without that implant his vision loss would approximate 95%. He argues that Paragraph 212(3)(M), unlike the previous statute, does not base the determination of vision loss on the employee's post-injury vision "with glasses." Accordingly, he argues that his vision loss should be evaluated in the absence of the implanted lens.
It is not necessary in this case to determine the significance of the removal of the phrase "with glasses" in Paragraph 212(3)(M), however, because we disagree with Tracy's assertion that a surgical implanted lens is analogous to an external contact lens or "glasses" as that term was understood in 1919. See P.L. 1919, ch. 238, ยง 16. The term "glasses," then and now, refers to externally applied lenses, and not a surgical correction to the eye. The fact that a part of the medical intervention included the insertion of an artificial lens does not place him in the same circumstances as a person whose vision loss exceeds 80% without the benefit of glasses. Because his vision loss after successful medical intervention, with or without the assistance of external glasses or contact lenses, does not approach the 80% loss required by section 212, his entitlement to benefits is not affected by the presence or absence of the phrase "with glasses' in Paragraph 212(3)(M).
Moreover, to allow recovery for the "actual" loss of an eye in circumstances where the employee's vision has been significantly restored would be directly contrary to the Legislature's intent to allow specific loss benefits only in instances of a total, catastrophic loss. Tracy's temporary loss of vision, corrected in part through surgery, is simply not comparable to the amputation of a body part. This Conclusion should not be understood to minimize the trauma that Tracy suffered when the staple entered his eye. Many employees, however, suffer extreme and traumatic injuries which never result in the receipt of specific loss benefits because no body part was actually lost.
The entry is:
Decision of the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed.
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