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Myers v. Goodwill Industries of Akron12/16/1998
SLABY, Presiding Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant, Theresa Myers, appeals an order of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Goodwill Industries of Akron ("Goodwill"), on Myers's negligent-retention claim. We affirm.
Myers was hired as a security coordinator by Goodwill on June 3, 1991. She was later promoted to the position of cashier coordinator. Terry McCarty and Gina Shook were Myers's supervisors. Goodwill eliminated Myers's position in 1993 as part of a reduction in force. She continued to work for Goodwill in a temporary capacity for several months, then obtained employment as a nurse's aid. Myers alleged that during her employment at Goodwill, McCarty engaged in a prolonged pattern of abuse and harassment toward her, including demeaning her in front of fellow employees, yelling at her, and making conflicting job demands.
On September 16, 1994, Myers filed a complaint against Goodwill alleging sex and age discrimination and negligent retention of Terry McCarty. Myers averred that McCarty acted improperly in his relationships with employees to a degree that constituted "malice and reckless disregard" for the tights of Myers and other employees. Myers also alleged that Goodwill retained McCarty in a supervisory capacity despite knowledge of his misconduct. On October 10, 1995, Goodwill moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Goodwill. Myers appealed, and on August 6, 1997, this court affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to Myers's sex and age-discrimination claims, but reversed on Myers's negligent-retention claim and remanded the case to the trial court.
On remand, Goodwill moved for summary judgment again. Myers responded and Med a cross-motion for summary judgment. On February 2, 1998, the trial court granted Goodwill's motion for summary judgment and denied Myers's motion. Myers timely appealed and has raised three assignments of error.
"The trial court erred in granting summary judgment contrary to the doctrine of the law of the case."
Myers argues that the prior decision of this court precluded the trial court from granting summary judgment in favor of Goodwill on remand. We disagree.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party." State ex rel. Hosvard v. Ferreri (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 587, 589, 639 N.E.2d 1189, 1192. Because the propriety of a trial court's decision granting summary judgment is a matter of law, our review is de novo. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 263, 267, 610 N.E.2d 1061, 1063-1064. All facts must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 686, 653 N.E.2d 1196, 1201-1202.
The moving party "bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motions, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party's claims." Vahila v. Hall (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1171. In doing so, the moving party must point to evidentiary materials, including "`the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts
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