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Key v. Chrysler Motors Corporation12/29/1998
scretion sparingly when considering expenses not specifically authorized by statute and precedent."
{6} Because the Judge who ordered the cost award in this case was not the same Judge who presided over the trial, Key argues that this Court is in as good a position to evaluate Chrysler's cost bill, suggesting that we need not apply the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review in this appeal. Key has not cited any authority to support this argument. See (arguments unsupported by cited authority need not be considered on appeal). In any event, we simply note that live testimony was presented on the hearing on Key's objections to Chrysler's cost bill. Thus, we remain committed to applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.
I. Is Chrysler Entitled to All, Part, or None of Its Costs?
A. Supreme Court Mandate
{7} Key initially argues that the district court should not have awarded costs because the Supreme Court declined to award costs in its opinion in Key I even though it ruled in favor of Chrysler on the merits. As Chrysler correctly observes, the Supreme Court's original opinion provided that " o costs are awarded." Key I, S.Ct. No. 22,587 slip op. at 22 (Filed May 31, 1996). Because of this statement in the original opinion, Chrysler filed a motion in which it requested clarification regarding Chrysler's right to costs at the district court level. The Supreme Court denied the motion but revised the opinion to state that " o appellate costs are awarded." . We agree with Chrysler that the Supreme Court's amended opinion demonstrates that the Supreme Court limited its ruling to the award of costs on appeal.
{8} Key also argues that as a matter of consistency the district court should have denied Chrysler's trial costs since Chrysler was not allowed to recover its appellate costs. We disagree. If the Supreme Court had perceived any potential inconsistency, it could have directed that Chrysler was not to be awarded its trial costs. Instead, the Supreme Court's actions underscore the fact that New Mexico courts are afforded discretion in the award of costs. In short, we believe the Supreme Court intended to allow the trial court to exercise its own sound discretion with regard to the award of costs at the trial court level.
B. Prevailing Party
{9} Key also argues that even if the Supreme Court's decision did not explicitly preclude the award of costs at the district court level, the district court should not have awarded Chrysler its costs because Chrysler did not prevail at trial. However, Key's argument ignores the fact that while Key may have won the battle at trial, it lost the war on appeal. See ) (Prevailing party "refers to prevailing at the time of final judgment, not to winning a single round."); ) (where plaintiffs lost first trial but were granted new trial and prevailed at second trial, plaintiffs were entitled to costs of first trial as ultimate prevailing party); see also ) (party who wins lawsuit is prevailing party); ) ("The taxation of costs must await the final determination of the case."). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in awarding Chrysler some of its trial costs even though Chrysler initially lost at the trial court level.
C. Financial Disparity of the Parties and the Chilling Effect of a Large Cost Award
{10} Even though the district court reduced Chrysler's cost award by 80%, Key argues that the district court should have completely denied Chrysler's costs because of the financial disparity of the parties. In contrast, Chrysler argues that the district court abused its discretion in reducing its cost award because of a perceived disparit
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