Konefal v. Hollis/Brookline Cooperative School District12/29/1998
the CBA in not renewing Ms. Konefal with little more than the plaintiffs' conclusory allegations that she was not renewed for her non-union status. The defendants dispute her assertion, and further, no court or agency has ever found that she was dismissed for this reason. Assuming as true that Ms. Konefal was terminated for her non- union status, see Gardner, 137 N.H. at 256, 624 A.2d at 1338, this dispute involves a wrongful termination which should be resolved before the PELRB in the first instance, see Bd. of Trustees, 126 N.H. at 342, 493 A.2d at 1124.
Because Ms. Konefal's claims require resolution of disputed fact, her claims involve a question of administrative discretion, cf. John H. v. Brunelle, 127 N.H. 40, 44, 500 A.2d 350, 352 (1985), and therefore, she should have exhausted her administrative remedies. Had Ms. Konefal further appealed to the PELRB, see RSA 273-A:5, I (1987), or to the State Board of Education, see RSA 189:14-b (1989), her dispute may have been favorably resolved based on a grievance procedure within the collective bargaining agreement, or upon statutory grounds. Instead, she sought judicial relief, asserting that her dismissal violated her constitutional rights. Cf. Appeal of City of Portsmouth, Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 140 N.H. 435, 438, 667 A.2d 345, 348 (1995) (deciding case raising free speech issue on statutory, rather than constitutional grounds). "If . . . an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of constitutional question, the administrative remedy plainly should be pursued." California Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958). Since Ms. Konefal circumvented the administrative process, no record exists to guide us in evaluating the constitutional question she asserts. Cf. In re Todd P., 127 N.H. 792, 798, 509 A.2d 140, 144 (1986). By statute, the legislature has established the PELRB as the primary forum to resolve these factual disputes. See RSA 273-A:5, I(c), :6, I.
An assertion that a constitutional right has been violated does not, by itself, obviate the requirement that a party exhaust administrative remedies. 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law ยง 512, at 499 (1994). If we were to accept a constitutional claim without exhausting administrative remedies, " he effect would be that important and difficult constitutional issues would be decided devoid of factual context and before it was clear that [appellants' constitutional rights were implicated]." DuBois Clubs v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 312 (1967). The trial court correctly denied the petitioner's substitution of a civil trial for the administrative proceedings specifically provided by the legislature. Accordingly, we decline to decide the constitutional question.
Next, we consider whether the trial court properly dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. We have held that one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for that emotional distress. Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493, 495, 593 A.2d 1158, 1159 (1991). The trial court found as a matter of law that the defendants' conduct was not extreme and outrageous. Assuming that Ms. Konefal was not renewed because of her non-union status, see Gardner, 137 N.H. at 255-56, 624 A.2d at 1338-39, that fact would at best indicate that her non-renewal arose from an improper motive that may support a claim for wrongful termination. See Cloutier v. A. & P. Tea Co., Inc., 121 N.H. 915, 922, 436 A.2d 1140, 1143-44 (1981). It would not, however, support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1994). "Although discharging an employee . . . may be illeg
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