Upton v. JWP Businessland8/18/1997
Contract, Employment. Public Policy. Employment, Termination. Estoppel.
For the purpose of considering the propriety of the allowance of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the following facts are relevant. At the time of her discharge, the plaintiff was the mother of a young son whom she cared for herself and supported entirely from her earnings. She commuted from Cape Cod to work for the defendant in Canton. When she was hired in April, 1991, she was told that her hours of work would be 8:15 A.M. to 5:30 P.M., with the need to work late on one or two days each month. The plaintiff arranged child care accordingly. In fact, the requirements of her job kept her until 6:30 P.M. to 7 P.M. from the outset and even later as the job progressed. In late July, 1991, the plaintiff was told that she would have to work until 9 or 10 P.M. each evening and all day Saturday for at least several months. The plaintiff informed her employer that she would not be able to work such hours because of her responsibilities as a mother. She was discharged two weeks later.
The general rule is that an at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at all. See Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., 417 Mass. 388, 394, 630 N.E.2d 586 (1994); Jackson v. Action for Boston Community Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 9, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988). Liability may be imposed on an employer, however, if an at-will employee is terminated for a reason that violates a clearly established public policy. See King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 582, 638 N.E.2d 488 (1994); Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 810, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991); DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 398 Mass. 205, 210, 496 N.E.2d 428 (1986). The public policy exception makes redress available to employees who are terminated for asserting a legal right (e.g., filing a workers' compensation claim), for doing what the law requires (e.g., serving on a jury), or for refusing to disobey the law (e.g., refusing to commit perjury). See Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State Sch., 404 Mass. 145, 149-150, 533 N.E.2d 1368 (1989). We have identified additional reasons for terminations which would directly contradict well-defined public policies of the Commonwealth. See Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., supra at 811 (at-will employee cooperated with law enforcement agency investigation of his employer); Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 402 Mass. 413, 416, 522 N.E.2d 975 (1988) (at-will employee allegedly discharged for enforcing safety laws which were her responsibility to enforce); DeRose v. Putnam Mgt. Co., 398 Mass. at 209-211 (at-will employee refused to give false testimony against coworker in criminal trial). See also Shea v. Emmanuel College, post, , (1997) (at-will employee who internally reports suspected criminal wrongdoing occurring within company entitled to recover when discharged for making such report).
On the other hand, we have held that other reasons for termination do not warrant recovery by an at-will employee. See King v. Driscoll, supra at 583 (participation in shareholder derivative suit); Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., 417 Mass. at 394-395 (failure to comply with employer's internal policy of mandatory drug testing); Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469, 475-476, 589 N.E.2d 1241 (1992) (nurse made internal reports of problems to high-ranking officials within hospital organization); Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 410 Mass. 581, 584, 574 N.E.2d 370 (1991) (employee hired as corporation's spokesperson publicly expressed views which conflicted with corporation's economic interests); Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E.
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