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Bills v. Arizona Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund2/2/1999
in such amounts as are necessary to pay the obligations of the fund pursuant to § 20-667 subsequent to an insolvency, the expenses of handling covered claims subsequent to an insolvency . . . and other expenses authorized pursuant to [the statutes]." Under § 20-667, the Fund "is obligated to the extent of the covered claims," § 20-667(A), and "is deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims and to such extent shall have all rights, duties and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the insurer had not become insolvent." § 20-667(C).
We must construe these provisions together, in the context of the overall statutory scheme, and aim to achieve consistency among them. Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch. Dist. No. 82 Bd. of Governors, 184 Ariz. 419, 909 P.2d 486 (App. 1995). So read, they limit the Fund's collection and payment obligations and its authority to "covered claims." See T & N PLC;Isaacson v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 750 P.2d 297 (Cal. 1988). The Fund's authority to assess member insurers for expenses pursuant to § 20-666(A) is limited to "expenses of handling covered claims" and "other expenses authorized" by the statutes. Tort damages do not qualify under either § 20-666(A) or § 20-667(C). See Clark Equip., 189 Ariz. at 446, 943 P.2d at 806 (" nlike tort claims, the Fund is empowered to collect assessments from member insurers to pay the costs associated with 'handling covered claims,' A.R.S. § 20-666(A), which include payments for attorneys' fees pursuant to A.R.S. section 12-341.01(A)."). Finally, contrary to plaintiff's contention, the Fund's general, permissive authority to " orrow funds necessary to carry out the intent of [the statutes]," " ue and be sued," and " erform such other acts as are necessary or proper to carry out the intent of [the statutes]," § 20-664(B)(3), (4), (6), does not "serve to create a cause of action where none exists" or "vitiate the effect of the immunity section." Schreffler v. Pennsylvania Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 586 A.2d 983, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
Although plaintiff contends Wells Fargo was wrongly decided, we agree with its reasoning and Conclusion. Moreover, Wells Fargo's rejection of bad faith claims against the Fund is consistent with the majority view of other courts that have analyzed similar statutory schemes and addressed the issue. See, e.g., T & N PLC; Fernandez; Veillon; Williams v. Champion Ins. Co., 590 So. 2d 736 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Schreffler; Vaughn; cf. Isaacson. The facts and procedural history in Schreffler were almost identical to those in this case. Interpreting an immunity provision essentially the same as Arizona's, the Pennsylvania court concluded that " pplying the clear language of the statute requires the Conclusion that there is no cause of action for bad faith failure to settle since settlement is a power conferred upon [the guaranty fund] under the terms of the Act." 586 A.2d at 985. We reach the same Conclusion here.
Washington Insurance Guaranty Association v. Ramsey, 922 P.2d 237 (Alaska 1996), cited by plaintiff, is inapposite. In that case, Ramsey (the insured's assignee) only sought payment, as a "covered claim," of a consent judgment totaling $300,000, the maximum amount recoverable under Washington's guaranty fund act. Id. at 239. Unlike plaintiff here, Ramsey sued merely to enforce the guaranty fund's statutory obligations. Interpreting Washington law, the Alaska court held that the Washington guaranty fund "had no immunity for a claim to enforce its statutory duties." Id. at 246. At bottom, that holding was premised on the court's recognition of a statutory duty to reasonably settle claims and its Conclusion that the fund's refusal to do so "is not a
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