COOK v. GREYHOUND BUS LINES
6/5/1995
Francis Cook appeals from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board denying his motion for an award of attorney fees. The fees were generated in connection with a claim Cook filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court in Texas involving his employer, Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc. Because we conclude that the Board has no statutory authority to award attorney fees for services rendered in a bankruptcy proceeding, we uphold the Board's decision.
Cook suffered a work-related injury on July 29, 1987 while employed by Greyhound, and was awarded total incapacity benefits by the Workers' Compensation Commission. Shortly after the award of benefits, Greyhound filed a petition in bankruptcy in Texas under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 1101-1125 (1994). Cook obtained bankruptcy counsel after Greyhound objected to his claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. The parties subsequently entered into a lump-sum settlement for $200,000 and, in conjunction with the lump-sum settlement, the Board approved a $20,000 fee for Cook's attorneys. Cook then filed a motion seeking an additional $53,796 in attorney fees generated by his bankruptcy attorney. The Board dismissed the motion asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We granted Cook's petition for appellate review pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A. § 322 (Supp. 1994).
39 M.R.S.A. § 110(2) (1989) provides in pertinent part:
If an employee prevails in any proceeding involving a
controversy under this Act, the Commission . . . may assess the
employer costs of a reasonable attorney's fee and witness fees
whenever the witness was necessary for the proper and
expeditious disposition of the case.
No attorney representing an employee who prevails in a
proceeding involving a controversy under this Act may receive
any fee from that client for an appearance before the
commission, . . . except as provided in section 83, subsection
7 and section 94-B, subsection 3.
or the purposes of this subsection, "prevail" means to
obtain more compensation benefits under the Act than were
offered to the employee by the employer in writing before the
proceeding was instituted. If no such offer was made, "prevail"
means to obtain or retain compensation under the Act.
(Emphasis added.) As Cook correctly notes, an employee who receives a lump-sum settlement may "prevail" for purposes of awarding fees. Ayotte v. United Servs., Inc., 567 A.2d 430, 434 (Me. 1989). Moreover, we are in agreement with Cook that the term "proceeding" in section 110(2) can be broadly construed. DeMello v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 611 A.2d 985, 986-87 (Me. 1992); Kennie v. City of Westbrook, 254 A.2d 39, 43 (Me. 1969). We agree with the Board, however, that neither the language nor the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act support the award sought here for attorney fees for services rendered in a bankruptcy proceeding.
We review decisions of the Workers' Compensation Board for errors of law.
LeBlanc v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 584 A.2d 675, 677 (Me. 1991). To the extent that decisions of the Board fall within their expertise, and construction of the
" he rights of a party under the nor is such authority necessary to the full and complete exercise of the Board's powers.
The Board's construction of section 110 is consistent with its legislative history. Prior to the statute's amendment in 1985, section 110 provided that "when the commission . . . finds that an employee has instituted proceedings under this chapter . . . or that the employer . . . has instituted proceedings under this chapter, the commission . . . may assess the employer
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