Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Company6/30/2000
N.E. 7 (1925). As a rule, " ords importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things." 5 ILCS 70/1.03 (West 1994). Accordingly, the reference to "the owner" includes all owners as defined in the Code, including WS.
In Wright v. Mr. Quick, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 236, 486 N.E.2d 908 (1985), our supreme court restated Gilbreath's general principle of lessor immunity and held that the contract at issue imposed no further duties on the lessor. The court did not discuss any ordinance or statute. WS argues that the Code, as the trial court interpreted it, effectively nullifies the general rule of Mr. Quick. While we do not decide the application of the Code to cases not before us, we note that the alleged conflict with a judicial decision provides no grounds for invalidating the ordinance. See City of Elgin v. County of Cook, 169 Ill. 2d 53, 63, 660 N.E.2d 875 (1995). We cannot ignore the plain language of the ordinance, which imposes duties upon WS as a firm having an equitable interest in the property.
WS maintains that by the lease it effectively delegated its duties to its agent, the bank, and the ordinance plainly contemplates such delegation. The ordinance explicitly refers to the responsibility of "the owner's legal agent." But appropriate delegation of duties does not exonerate a landowner. Stewart v. Beegun, 126 Ill. App. 2d 120, 261 N.E.2d 491 (1970). The ordinance imposed a non-delegable duty on WS to maintain the lift in safe operating condition. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §424 (1965); Ramirez v. Redevelopment Agency, 4 Cal. App. 3d 397, 400, 84 Cal. Rptr. 356, 357 (1970); Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md. App. 25, 37, 366 A.2d 101, 109 (1976). An owner may be liable for violation of an ordinance, even if the owner has surrendered possession and control of the premises to a tenant. Jones v. Polish Falcons, 244 Ill. App. 3d 348, 353, 614 N.E.2d 397 (1993). In this case, as in Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co. v. Evans Construction Co., 32 Ill. 2d 600, 607-08, 208 N.E.2d 573 (1965), both the landowner and the tenant had non-delegable duties to make the premises safe. We agree with the trial court that the plaintiff must still prove negligence, although the landowner remains liable for the negligence of his agent or an independent contractor hired to perform the non-delegable duty. Restatement (Second) of Torts §424, Comment b (1965).
Next, WS contends that it cannot be liable because it received neither actual nor constructive notice of the lift's defects. See Smolek v. K.W. Landscaping, 266 Ill. App. 3d 226, 228, 639 N.E.2d 974 (1994). "A possessor of land owes an invitee a duty of exercising reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions on his land." Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 468, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976). The owner has constructive notice of all conditions discoverable by reasonable inspection of the premises. See Todd v. S.S. Kresge Co., 303 Ill. App. 89, 100, 24 N.E.2d 899 (1939). A plaintiff may prove constructive notice by establishing that the condition persisted long enough that the defendant should have discovered the condition through the exercise of reasonable care. A principal also has constructive notice of all material facts known to its agent. Protective Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 144 Ill. App. 3d 682, 694, 494 N.E.2d 1241 (1986).
Here plaintiff presented evidence that an inspector found the cable very dry and rusty, and in need of replacement, in October 1993. The parties most likely to replace the cable admit that they did not do so, and the bank's maintenance supervisor swore that, as far as he knew, the cable was not replaced. Because plaintiff showed that a reasonable inspection
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