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Montgomery Independent School District v. Davis12/7/2000
BR>
(2) proposal for granting relief.
(c) The board . . . may reject or change a finding of fact made by the hearing examiner only after reviewing the record of the proceedings before the hearing examiner and only if the finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence.
(d) The board . . . shall state in writing the reason and legal basis for a change or rejection made under this section. Id. § 21.259. Whether the Board's actions comport with this section is the focus of the parties' arguments in this case.
The Board makes essentially one argument - that its actions were authorized because school districts must have the power to interpret their own policies, and that only the Board can ultimately determine what "failure to maintain an effective working relationship, or maintain good rapport, with parents, the community, or colleagues" means in that school district. If by applying or interpreting this policy the hearing examiner is permitted to determine the ultimate question of whether a teacher's contract should be renewed, then the Board claims that the examiner has improperly usurped the Board's authority to apply and interpret its own non-renewal policy. The Board emphasizes that such a result would have the consequence of defeating one of the Legislature's goals in the 1995 Education Code revisions, preserving local control and management of the public schools. See Tex. Educ. Code §§ 7.003, 11.151(b); Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 933 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex. App. - Austin 1996, writ denied). Because the Board views the hearing examiner's finding of fact number 17 as a legal conclusion that Davis did not violate district policy, it argues that the finding was actually an ultimate policy determination only the Board could make. The Board further claims that it could make its own additional factfindings based on the general reservation of power to school boards in Education Code §§ 7.003, 11.151(b), and in the absence of a prohibition on such additional factfinding in section 21.259.
Davis responds that the hearing examiner was entitled to find as a matter of fact that she did not fail to maintain effective working relationships or good rapport because that determination is an ultimate fact that turns on the resolution of many underlying evidentiary facts. Moreover, Davis adds, while section 21.259 permits the Board to reject or change a finding of fact, it can do so only if the finding is not supported by substantial evidence, which finding of fact 17 clearly was. See Tex. Educ. Code § 21.259(c). She further argues that section 21.259 does not permit the Board to add findings of fact precisely because the Board's review of findings under that section is limited to a substantial evidence review. Finally, even if the Board were authorized to add findings, Davis argues that the findings the Board added do not support its purported conclusion of law that Davis failed to maintain effective working relationships or good rapport.
We cannot accept either party's interpretation of the statute. The Board's reading is too expansive, while Davis' is too restrictive. The plain language of section 21.259 delineates the Board's role once it chooses to have a hearing examiner serve as the factfinder. Subpart (a) requires a school board to "announce" a decision including findings of fact and conclusions of law, and subparts (b), (c), and (d) then clearly limit what the board may do when reviewing the hearing examiner's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tex. Educ. Code § 21.259. A board may adopt, reject, or change the hearing examiner's conclusions of law or proposal for granting relief. Id. § 21.259(b). A board may reject or change a finding of fact
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