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INTERFACE GROUP v. FREEMAN DECORATING6/28/1996
Interface Group-Nevada, Inc. appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Freeman Decorating Co. in this indemnification case. Concluding that the trial court erred, we reverse.
The evidence shows that Interface organized a computer trade show in Atlanta, Georgia known as COMDEX. It entered into a licensing agreement with the Georgia World Congress Center ("GWCC") to use its facilities for the show. Pursuant to an existing contract between Interface and Freeman, Freeman was responsible for setting up the show. To fulfill its obligations to Interface, Freeman contracted with its sister company, Sullivan Transfer Co., to provide drayage services. While working as Sullivan's employee, Rebecca Ackridge was injured when she attempted to ride a motor scooter between traffic cones and barrels that GWCC had erected to prevent people from entering a construction area. Unbeknownst to Ackridge, GWCC employees had tied a rope between the barrels, which allegedly was not visible. The rope caught Ackridge across her neck and pulled her to the ground.
Ackridge sued GWCC and Interface for negligence. Before trial, however, she dismissed her claim against Interface. GWCC asserted a cross-claim against Interface seeking indemnification under the terms of the licensing agreement it had with Interface. GWCC then moved for summary judgment on its cross-claim based on the indemnity provision in the licensing agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to GWCC, ruling that Interface's indemnity obligation to GWCC extended to any claims for negligence on GWCC's part, including claims premised on GWCC's sole negligence. Interface does not challenge the validity of that ruling.
Following the ruling, Interface filed a third-party complaint against Freeman, wherein it sought indemnification under the contract Freeman and Interface had executed. That contract provides in pertinent part that: "Freeman and Interface shall each indemnify, defend and hold the other harmless from and against any and all liabilities, suits, and claims made against the other which arise from the misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance of the indemnifying party. Neither Freeman nor Interface shall, by reason of this [contract], assume any liability for the negligence or wilful acts of the other, nor shall either be deemed to have indemnified the other against the negligence or wilful acts of the other." Both Freeman and Interface filed motions for summary judgment seeking a determination as to whether Freeman was obligated to indemnify Interface under the above-mentioned contractual provision. The trial court
granted Freeman's motion for summary judgment holding that as a matter of law Freeman had no such obligation. The trial court then dismissed Interface's third-party complaint. Thereafter, Ackridge's suit proceeded to trial, during which Ackridge agreed to settle the case for $200,000, which Interface paid to her.
1. Interface contends that the trial court erred in granting Freeman's summary judgment motion because there are issues of material fact regarding whether Interface's liability or the claim against it arose from any misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance on Freeman's part. We agree. The trial court ruled that Freeman was entitled to summary judgment because Interface's liability to GWCC " not rest on the negligence of Freeman." In reaching its ruling, the trial court apparently concluded that to "arise from" means the same thing as being "proximately caused by." Under such an interpretation, Interface would be entitled to indemnity from Freeman only if it was found vicariously liable for Freeman's negligence, yet in this case, no such liability could exist because it is undis
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