Harmon v. Belcan Eng. Group4/30/1997
Per Curiam.
On April 6, 1994, appellant June A. Harmon filed a complaint in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas alleging that she was subjected to unlawful quid pro quo sexual harassment by appellees Isaac Gilliam and Belcan Engineering Group, Inc. ("Belcan"), in violation of R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.99. The complaint also included a negligent-supervision/retention claim against Belcan. Subsequently, appellant filed a federal civil rights claim and appellees removed the cause to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The cause was remanded to the Hamilton County Cow t of Common Pleas after appellant dismissed her claim under federal law.
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on June 30, 1996. Following oral argument on August 3, 1995, the trial court granted appellees' motion by entry dated August 8, 1996. Appellant appealed on August 9, 1996.
Appellant's two assignments of error, which allege that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on appellant's claims for sexual harassment and negligent supervision/retention, will be considered together.
In Ohio, "federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code, is generally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112." Little Forest Med. Ctr. vsOhio Civ. Rights Comm. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 609-610, 575 N.E.2d 1164, 1167, quoting Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 196, 20 O.O.3d 200, 202-203, 421 N.E.2d 128, 131; Neal v. Hamilton Cty. (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670, 676-677, 622 N.E.2d 1130, 1135; Pulver v. Rookwood Highland Tower Invest. (Mar. 26, 1997), Hamilton App. Nos. C-950361 and C-950492, unreported, 1997 WL 133422. In analyzing statutory sexual-harassment claims, we look to the statute, R.C. 4112.02(A), to the administrative counterpart, and to federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code. Delaney v. Skyline Lodge, Inc. (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 264, 270, 642 N.E.2d 396, 399; Retterer v. Whirlpool Corp. (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 847, 677 N.E.2d 417.
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs where the employee's submission to or rejection of unwelcome sexual conduct is used as the basis for promotion or other employment decisions. Western-Southern Like Ins. Co. v. Fridley (1990), 69 Ohio App.3d 190, 194, 590 N.E 2d 325, 328. To prevail on a claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment, the employee-plaintiff must show (1) that the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) that the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) that the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) that the employee's submission to the unwelcomed advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits, or that the employee's refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and (5) the existence of respondent superior liability. Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc. (C.A.6, 1992), 970 F.2d 178, 185-186; Highlander v. KFC. Nat. Mgt. Co. (C.A.6, 1986), 805 F.2d 644, 648. In an action for quad pro quo sexual harassment, an employer is held strictly liable for the conduct of itssupervisory employees having authority over hiring, advancement, dismissal, and discipline, under the theory of respondent superior. Id.
In granting appellees' motion for summary judgment in the case sub judice, the trial court held that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof with res
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