Powers v. H.B. Smith Co.5/20/1997
Practice, Civil, Default, Relief from judgment, New trial, Judgment notwithstanding verdict, Attorney's fees. Anti-Discrimination Law, Age, Termination of employment, Prima facie case, Burden of proof, Attorney's fees, Damages. Employment, Discrimination, Termination. Evidence, Relevancy and materiality. Damages, Under anti-discrimination law, Emotional distress.
BROWN, J. This case, that seemingly neither party wanted to win, causes us to navigate around numerous procedural tangles and wade through several critical missteps. As will be seen, after this curious journey, all we are left with is the uncomfortable sense that the ultimate result is not "inconsistent with substantial Justice." Mass.R.Civ.P. 61, 365 Mass. 829 (1974).
After being discharged from his position as a quality control inspector with H.B. Smith Company, Inc. (Smith), the plaintiff, Robert C. Powers, filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) alleging age discrimination. On February 3, 1994, the plaintiff, with the MCAD's assent, filed this action in Superior Court. In the complaint, the plaintiff, for the first time, named Mestek, Inc. (Mestek), as a defendant. Prior to trial, Mestek moved for summary judgment contending that, since it was not named in the MCAD complaint, the plaintiff's claim against it was barred. The motion Judge agreed and entered judgment for Mestek.
Returning a verdict on special questions, a Superior Court jury found the plaintiff was discharged "by reason of age discrimination" and awarded him $750,000 in damages. The defendant then filed a motion for a new trial. The trial Judge denied Smith's motion, but reduced the damage award to $350,000. Both parties appeal from the ensuing judgment. The defendant argues that: (a) it was error to allow the plaintiff's motion for relief from a default judgment; (b) the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence; (c) certain evidence was improperly admitted or excluded; (d) the damages were excessive; and (e) the trial Judge abused his discretion in denying its posttrial motions. The plaintiff, in turn, contends that the trial Judge erred in denying his request for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also argues that summary judgment was improperly entered for Mestek.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury would have been warranted in finding the following facts. Smith is a manufacturer of boilers. The plaintiff began working for Smith in January, 1982, as a quality control inspector. The plaintiff's duties included the processing of returned parts. When defective parts were returned, the plaintiff would check to see if they were still under warranty and then arrange for the parts to be returned to the vendors. The plaintiff also inspected parts purchased from vendors to ensure that they met company specifications.
In 1986 or 1987, Smith opened a new plant approximately five miles away from its main facility and moved the assembly line for residential boilers to the new plant. Prior to that time, the assembly work had been performed at the main plant. Initially, the plaintiff assisted in monitoring the new assembly line, as Smith had not yet hired an inspector for the new facility. Marianne Fortier was later hired as quality control inspector for the new plant. The plaintiff, however, filled in for Fortier when she was on vacation, performing Fortier's duties with the exception of the "100th boiler test." The plaintiff had not been trained to perform that test. The plaintiff also performed several quality control functions that Fortier had not.
Sometime prior to 1990, Sm
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