Hallgren v. Integrated Financial Corp.5/22/1997
Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap. Employment, Discrimination.
DREBEN, J. The only issue on appeal is whether a temporary disability -- a knee injury -- from which the plaintiff fully recovered in a month and from which she has no residual disability, is a handicap within the meaning G. L. c. 151B, § 1. In this action, brought by the plaintiff alleging that her termination was discrimination on the basis of her handicap, a Judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that "such a temporary injury does not amount to a handicap or make the plaintiff a handicapped individual." We affirm.
General Laws c. 151B, § 4(16), as inserted by St. 1983, c. 533, § 6, provides in relevant part that it shall be an unlawful practice:
"for any employer . . . to . . . refuse to hire, rehire or advance in employment or otherwise discriminate against, because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation . . . ."
The defendant argues that the plaintiff did not have a "handicap" within the meaning of c. 151B. As defined in § 1(17), as appearing in St. 1989, c. 722, § 11:
"The term 'handicap' means (a) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities of a person; (b) a record of having such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such impairment . . . ."
While there is no Massachusetts case law discussing temporary handicaps, there is considerable authority construing the analogous Federal statutes. "Because of the similarity between the Federal and State statutes, the Federal cases are most helpful in the resolution of cases involving G. L. c. 151B, which prohibits employment discrimination against qualified handicapped persons." Cox v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass. 375, 384, 607 N.E.2d 1035 (1993). See LaBonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 816 n.5 (1997). Indeed, the Federal definition of "disability," set forth in the margin, is almost word for word the definition of "handicap" under c. 151B, § 1(17).
The regulations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) make clear that not every impairment renders an individual disabled. "The determination of whether an individual has a disability is . . . based on . . . the effect of impairment on the life of the individual." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app. at 339 (1996). "Temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. Such impairments may include, but are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza." Ibid.
The Federal cases are in accord that temporary disabilities not resulting in permanent injuries are not disabilities under the legislation. See, e.g., Evans v. Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852-853 (5th Cir. 1988) (knee injury of noncontinuing nature not handicap within Rehabilitation Act); McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1995) (two month recuperation from surgery does not qualify under Rehabilitation Act or ADA); Sanders v. Arneson Prod., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996) (three and one-half month psychological impairment not a disability within ADA); Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (sporadic transitory illness not covered under Rehabilitation Act); Paegle v. Department of Interior, 813 F. Supp. 61, 64-65 (D.D.C. 1993) (temporary back injury of approximately eight months not handicap for purposes of Rehabilitation Act); Blanton v. Winston Printing Co., 868 F. Supp. 8
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