 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
NICHOLS v. THE LIGHTHOUSE RESTAURANT5/2/1997
The intervening plaintiff, Henkels & McCoy, appeals from a summary judgment rendered against it in a negligence action arising out of a workers' compensation claim. The sole issue is whether an employer's right to intervene in its employee's action, asserting a claim to recover workers' compensation benefits from a third party tortfeasor, is subject to the applicable two year statute of limitations without regard to the timing of the employee's action.
The plaintiff, Charles Nichols, commenced this negligence action on August 4, 1993, after he sustained injuries in a fall on August 20, 1991, while he was at the defendant restaurant, The Lighthouse Restaurant, Inc. On September 1, 1993, the plaintiff's employer, Henkels & McCoy, intervened as a plaintiff seeking reimbursement for sums it had paid to the plaintiff under the Workers' Compensation Act. General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The restaurant moved for summary judgment on the intervening complaint, arguing that the two year statute of limitations applicable to negligence causes of action under General Statutes § 52-584 barred the intervening complaint. The trial court granted the
motion for summary judgment in favor of the restaurant and the intervening plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thompson & Peck, Inc. v. Division Drywall, Inc., 241 Conn. 370, 374, ___ A.2d ___ (1997).
As a preliminary matter, it is important to correct the fallacy in the intervening plaintiff's argument where it confuses the statute of limitations and the thirty day filing period provided by statute to an intervening third party. The intervening plaintiff mistakenly assumes the two concepts are related and misapplies Lakewood Metal Products, Inc. v. Capital Machine & Switch Co., 154 Conn. 708, 226 A.2d 392 (1967).
In Lakewood Metal Products, Inc., the employee filed a motion for permission to intervene as a plaintiff, but did so beyond both the statute of limitations period and the thirty day filing period. The employee alleged that he had not received notice of the underlying complaint that was filed by the plaintiff, his employer, and was, therefore, entitled to intervene. Id., 709. The defendants argued that the employee should not be permitted to intervene because he failed to assert his claim within the applicable statute of limitations period. Id., 710.
Our Supreme Court stated: "We need not . . . determine the efficacy of the defense presented by the defendants because it is prematurely raised. . . . The only
statute we need be concerned with is § 31-293 of the General Statutes. It allows intervention by the employer or the employee in an action brought by the other against a third party legally liable for a compensable injury to the employee, provided such intervention is made within thirty days after notification of the action by the other has been given. . . . As the plaintiff never notified [the employee], he could not be barred from intervening by the passage of the time which this statute prescribes [thirty days], because, until notice is given, the [thirty days] does not begin to run. . . . The granting of the motion to intervene will merely allow [the employee] to file his intervening complaint. . . . ny defens
Page 1 2 3 4 Connecticut Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|