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Vignos v. Dawkins3/16/2000
This is an appeal of a post-answer default judgment granted to appellee, Trevor A. Dawkins, against his former wife, appellant, Suzanne L. Vignos. In three points of error, we are asked to reverse because the trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant's motion for new trial. Appellee has not filed a brief with this Court.
Background
Trevor Dawkins sued his former wife, Suzanne Dawkins Vignos, to recover a $4000 loan made in October 1996 and a $13,000 loan made to Vignos in January 1997. Counsel for Vignos answered the lawsuit with a verified denial and asserted several affirmative defenses. Counsel then withdrew, and Vignos proceeded pro se. Several months later, when Vignos failed to appear for trial, the trial court awarded Dawkins a default judgment for $17,000, plus interest. Vignos's motion for new trial, supported by her affidavit, was overruled.
In her first two points of error, Vignos asserts the trial court should not have granted a post-answer default judgment against her and denied her motion for a new trial, because she did not receive reasonable or proper notice of the trial setting.
Standard of Review
A post-answer default is one rendered when a defendant has filed an answer, but then fails to appear at trial. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979). In reviewing a motion for new trial after a post-answer default judgment, we apply a three-part test to determine whether the trial court should have granted a new trial, specifically, here: (1) was Vignos' failure to appear for trial intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on her part, or was it due to a mistake or an accident; (2) did Vignos's motion for new trial set up a meritorious defense; and (3) was Vignos's motion for new trial filed at a time when its granting would not result in a delay or otherwise injure Dawkins. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939); Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. 1987) (the three Craddock requirements apply to post-answer default judgments).
We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Director, State Employees Workers' Compensation Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1994). A trial court abuses its discretion if it denies a motion for new trial when the defendant satisfies the Craddock standard. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott, 873 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. 1994).
Relevant Chronology
The trial court's scheduling order scheduled a pre-trial conference for March 20, 1998, and set the case for trial on March 30, with a notation that, if the case was not assigned by the second Friday after that date [March 30], the case would be reset. An information sheet attached to the scheduling order states that the pretrial conference and trial dates can be changed only by motion filed and heard by the court. Vignos's affidavit in support of her motion for new trial recites her attendance at the pretrial conference and confirms an entry on the pre- trial conference form informing the trial coordinator that, with the exception of May 4th, Dawkins's attorney was unavailable for trial in April and May.
The May 13, 1998 final judgment recites that Vignos did not appear for trial on March 30, pursuant to the previously issued scheduling order; however, no entry was made on the trial court's docket sheet for March 30. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, issued after the hearing on the motion for new trial, recite that Vignos received notice of the March 30 trial setting, but she did not appear. Both the final judgment and the findings of fact and conclusions of law state that
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