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Metoskie v. Bank of America Texas3/9/2000
John Metoskie sued Bank of America Texas (BOA) and Susan Maurer for employment discrimination and retaliation under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. ยงยง 21.001-21.306 (Vernon 1996). Metoskie appeals the summary judgments granted in favor of BOA and Maurer. In two points of error, Metoskie argues summary judgment was inappropriate because (1) there are disputed issues of fact, and (2) the trial court incorrectly ruled Maurer could not be a defendant under the labor code. We affirm the trial court's judgment because (1) BOA presented sufficient evidence to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Metoskie, (2) Metoskie failed to present any probative evidence to show that BOA's proffered reason for Metoskie's termination was a pretext and the real reason for his termination was age and/or sex discrimination, and (3) Mauer was properly dismissed as a defendant under the labor code. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In Metoskie's first issue he argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on his discrimination claim and his retaliation claim because there are fact issues as to both claims. To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) non-protected class employees were not treated similarly. See Azubuike v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 970 S.W.2d 60, 64 (Tex.App._Houston [14 th Dist.] 1998, no writ). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any allegedly unequal treatment. See id. After the employer articulates legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's articulated reasons were a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See id. Although the burden of production shifts, the burden of persuasion remains continuously with the plaintiff. See id.
Assuming Metoskie's allegations established a prima facie case of race discrimination, the burden then shifted to BOA to prove a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged unequal treatment. According to BOA's summary judgment proof, Metoskie for some time, did not meet its performance criteria. As a residential loan officer, Metoskie was expected to submit three to four loan applications per week, and after ninety days, fund three to four loans per month, totaling approximately $1 million in fundings per month. From May 1994 through November 1994, Metoskie submitted only thirteen loan applications and funded only five loans totaling approximately $1.6 million. He submitted no applications and funded no loans during the remainder of 1994. From January 1995 until his termination in April 1995, Metoskie submitted only two applications and funded no loans. The summary judgment evidence indicates Metoskie was given verbal and written warnings and eventually was placed on probation due to his performance. After reviewing BOA's summary judgment evidence, we conclude BOA properly articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Thus, the burden of production then shifted back to Metoskie to show that BOA's articulated reason was a pretext for age and/or sex discrimination. To meet this burden, Metoskie offered his own affidavit disputing he did meet his performance/production standards in 1994. He does not, however, offer any explanation for his lack of production from December, 1994 to April 1995. Consequently, we cannot conclude Metoskies's evidence suggests that BOA's neutral reasons were a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Thus, we co
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