 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Stuckey v. State Budget and Control Board3/20/2000
Appeal From Richland County Jackson V. Gregory, Circuit Court Judge
Heard November 16, 1999
AFFIRMED
This appeal is from a circuit court order affirming respondent State Budget and Control Board's (Board's) final administrative denial of appellant's request to purchase two years of educational leave retirement credit. We affirm.
FACTS
The facts in this case are undisputed. Appellant began employment as a public school teacher in August 1972 and was enrolled in the state retirement plan until she terminated her employment in June 1973. She entered law school full-time in August 1973 and graduated May 10, 1976. On October 8, 1976, she began employment with the State Department of Education.
In May 1995, appellant filed a request with respondent South Carolina Retirement Systems (Agency) for two years' retroactive educational leave pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 9-1-1140 which at the time provided in pertinent part:
A member who leaves employment to attend graduate school and returns directly to employment may establish up to two years' retirement credit by paying the actuarial cost as determined by the [State Budget and Control] Board.
(emphasis added).
Agency denied appellant's request on the ground she had not returned "directly" to, covered employment. On appeal, the Board and the circuit court both affirmed Agency's decision.
ISSUES
1. Is Agency's interpretation of § 9-1-1140 arbitrary and capricious?
2. Does it violate equal protection?
3. Did Agency miscalculate the ninety-day period?
DISCUSSION
1. Arbitrary and capricious
The dispute in this case centers on the statutory requirement that an applicant requesting retirement credit for educational leave must have returned "directly" to covered employment. Agency interpreted the word "directly" in § 9-1-1140 to mean "immediately" but allowed a grace period of ninety days to return to covered employment. The grace period was apparently formulated to accommodate teachers who have an annual three month lapse in employment during the summer but it was applied to all covered employees, not only teachers. Agency found appellant's re employment did not commence within this ninety-day period.
Appellant contends she returned directly to covered employment because she was not otherwise employed between her attendance at law school and her subsequent covered employment.
Both "immediately" and "next in order" are common meanings for the word "directly." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Second Edition, Unabridged (1987). In the context of § 9-1-1140, "directly" can have either meaning and the statute is therefore ambiguous. In construing an ambiguous statute, we give great deference to the government agency's consistent application of the statute. Bunch v. Cobb, 273 S.C. 445, 257 S.E.2d 225 (1979).
Further, after appellant filed her claim, the legislature amended § 9-1-1140 to specifically provide:
A member who leaves covered employment to attend undergraduate or graduate school and returns to covered employment within ninety days after the member's last date of enrollment may establish up to two years' retirement credit by paying the actuarial cost as determined by the board.
(emphasis added). A subsequent statutory amendment may be interpreted as clarifying original legislative intent. Cotty v. Yartzeff, 309 S.C. 259, 422 S.E.2d 100 (1992). The legislature's subsequent adoption of a specific time period in § 9-1-1140 is evidence of legislative intent that "directl
Page 1 2 3 4 South Carolina Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|