Hayashi v. Scott Company3/14/2000
statutory provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
HRS § 91-14(g). "Under HRS § 91-14(g), [COLs] are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3); [FOFs] are reviewable under subsection (5); and an agency's exercise of discretion is reviewable under subsection (6)." Potter v. Hawaii Newspaper Agency, 89 Hawai`i 411, 422, 974 P.2d 51, 62 (1999) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai`i 217, 229, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327 (1998) (quoting Konno v. County of Hawai`i, 85 Hawai`i 61, 77, 937 P.2d 397, 413 (1997) (quoting Bragg v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins., 81 Hawai`i 302, 305, 916 P.2d 1203, 1206 (1996)))).
Moreover, we have observed that: ppeals taken from [FOFs] set forth in decisions of the [LIRAB] are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Thus, the court considers whether such a finding is learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record[.] The clearly erroneous standard requires the court to sustain the [LIRAB's] findings unless the court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.
A . . . is not binding on an appellate court and is freely reviewable for its correctness. Thus, the court reviews [COLs] de novo, under the right/wrong standard.
Bumanglag v. Oahu Sugar Co., Ltd., 78 Hawai`i 275, 279, 892 P.2d 468, 472 (1995) (quoting Tate v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co., 77 Hawai`i 100, 102-03, 881 P.2d 1246, 1248-49 (1994) (brackets in original)).
Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. County of Maui, 86 Hawai`i 66, 68-69, 947 P.2d 378, 380-81 (1997) (some brackets added and some in original).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The LIRAB properly determined when the statute of limitations begins for a HRS § 386-82 claim.
The instant case presents a very narrow question on appeal - -when does the statute of limitations for a HRS § 386-82 workers' compensation claim begin to run? The LIRAB determined that the limitation period of a "claim does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable person, should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character of an injury or disease." Demond v. University of Hawaii, 54 Haw. 98, 104, 503 P.2d 434, 438 (1972).
Scott and Argonaut maintain that, under HRS § 386-82, the two-year statute of limitations begins to run at the point when the employee's work-related injury has a disabling effect that requires the employee to seek medical attention. Put another way, they assert that a workers' compensation claim starts to accrue when the disabling effects of the injury become manifest, either upon seeking medical treatment or by being disabled from performing the employee's ordinary work duties. Tomita v. Hotel Service Center, 2 Haw. App. 157, 159, 628 P.2d 205, 208 (1981).
In Tomita, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed a LIRAB decision determining that the employee's claim was timely and compensable because it was filed within two years of the injury becoming manifest. The ICA stated that the employee's injury became manifest when the effects of the injury forced [the employee] to seek medical attention and prevented her from working. Tomita at
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