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Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.3/27/2000
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has certified the following two questions to this court: 1) Does OCGA § 51-1-6 or § 51-1-8 give rise to a cognizable claim for breach of a legal duty where the duty allegedly breached is the violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.? 2) Does OCGA § 51-1-6 or § 51-1-8 give rise to a cognizable claim for breach of a legal duty where the duty allegedly breached is the violation of OCGA § 34-1-2? For the reasons that follow, we answer both of these questions in the negative.
Appellant Richard Reilly began working for Appellee Alcan Aluminum Ltd. ("Alcan") in 1974 in the area of safety management. In 1994, Alcan terminated Reilly's employment. Reilly subsequently filed a complaint in the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that Alcan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) when it terminated his employment, and that this constituted a breach of a state imposed public duty under § 51-1-6. In this regard, Reilly contended that Alcan used a "grade-age matrix" in making personnel decisions, and that Reilly's age impermissibly influenced Alcan's decision to terminate him. Reilly also alleged that Alcan violated Georgia's age discrimination statute, OCGA § 34-1-2, in terminating him, and that in doing so, Alcan violated public and private duties created by § 51-1-6 and § 51-1-8.
The district court dismissed Reilly's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, ruling, among other things, that neither § 51-1-6 nor § 51-1-8 creates a cause of action for the alleged underlying violation of the ADEA or § 34-1-2. The district court also based its dismissal on the ground that Reilly was an employee at-will. The court reasoned that since § 51-1-6 and § 51-1-8 do not specifically create exceptions to the at-will employee doctrine, Reilly could not recover in tort under Georgia law for his discharge. In certifying its questions to this Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that this Court was free to consider the significance of Reilly's employee at-will status in considering the certified questions.
1. We conclude that Reilly's status as an at-will employee is dispositive of the certified questions, and requires that we answer both questions in the negative.
Pursuant to OCGA § 34-7-1, an at-will employee generally may be terminated for any reason, and the employee may not recover from the employer in tort for wrongful discharge. Although there can be public policy exceptions to the doctrine, judicially created exceptions are not favored, and Georgia courts thus generally defer to the legislature to create them. In the present case, we need not consider the extent of this Court's authority to create an exception to the employee-at-will doctrine because we conclude that the various statutes express the General Assembly's intent, and thus the public policy, that an at-will employee may not sue in tort under § 51-1-6 or § 51-1-8 for wrongful discharge based upon age discrimination.
First, § 51-1-6 and § 51-1-8 merely set forth general principles of tort law, and do not specifically create an exception to the at-will employee doctrine. Moreover, when the General Assembly enacted Georgia's age-discrimination statute in 1971, it did not provide a civil remedy, but instead only provided for criminal misdemeanor penalties. The failure to provide a civil remedy in § 34-1- 2 is significant considering that the General Assembly has created specific civil remedies in other areas of employer action against employees and considering that the General Assembly is presumed to have enacted the statute with knowledge th
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