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Odom v. Fairbanks Memorial Hospital Lutheran Health Systems3/17/2000
e stated reason reported to the Data Bank, the court concluded that a jury question was presented as to whether the report to the Data Bank was false and whether the defendant who had made the report knew it to be so. That is not the situation here where the complaint and exhibits attached to the complaint demonstrate the facial truth of the report to the Data Bank -- that Odom was suspended for stated reasons expressed by FMH that fairly fell within the coded reasons. The statutory privilege would be meaningless if it meant that one who accurately reported the stated reasons for a health care provider's action would nonetheless have to defend the underlying validity of the stated reasons. Thus, to the extent that Odom's claim is based on the assertion that the stated reasons relied on by the health care provider were not those reported to the Data Bank, Odom's claim was properly dismissed.
However, Odom's defamation claim asserts many communications other than the falsity of the stated reasons reported to the Data Bank. To the extent that it does so it alleges a prima facie case of defamation. Paragraphs 3, 5, 9, 50, and 146-150 of Odom's complaint allege a prima facie case of defamation.
D. The Order of Suspension Does Not Preclude Odom from Suing FMH for Breach of an Oral Contract.
Odom claims FMH breached an oral contract. The contract, he alleges, resulted from statements made by defendant Ronald Bliss, on which Odom relied when he withdrew his request for an administrative hearing. Odom's complaint alleges:
On August 30, 1994 Defendant Bliss entered into a verbal agreement with [Odom's] attorney Burbank authorizing [Odom's] course of study at LLUMC as a remedy which if satisfactorily completed, would fulfill the June 2, 1994 Order of Suspension and allow [Odom] to return to his practice at FMH. Bliss and Burbank further agreed that in light of [Odom's] participation in the training program at Loma Linda that the FMH medical staff administrative hearing scheduled for November, 1994 would not be required.
The alleged oral contract was made subsequent to Odom receiving the Order of Suspension, which listed three options the Executive Committee could take in relation to Odom's suspension.
The Order of Suspension, dated June 2, 1994 is clear; Odom's suspension was to continue until "the earliest of one [of three] events." The existence of the Order of Suspension does not, however, preclude Odom from making a claim that there was a separate oral contract made and breached by FMH. Whether an oral contract exists is an issue for the trier of fact and was improperly dismissed by the superior court. See George v. Custer, 862 P.2d 176, 178 n.3 (Alaska 1993) ("It is for the trier of fact to determine whether an oral contract exists and the contract's terms where the evidence conflicts."); B.B. & S. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Stone, 535 P.2d 271, 273 (Alaska 1975) ("Where the existence of an oral contract and the terms thereof are the points in issue and the evidence is conflicting, it is for the trier of the facts to determine whether the contract did in fact exist and, if so, the terms thereof.").
E. Odom Stated a Claim for Violation of Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Odom sought relief for violation of AS 45.50.471(a), (b)(7), (11) and (12). Odom, as a private litigant, sued for violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act pursuant to former AS 45.50.531. "Two elements must be proved to establish a prima facie case of unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the Alaska Act: (1) that the defendant is engaged in trade or commerce; and (2) that in the conduct of trade or commerce, an unfair act or practice has
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