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Boeing Company v. Lee9/11/2000
This case requires us to decide whether RCW 51.52.130, the Industrial Insurance Act provision authorizing attorney fees on appeal from a worker's compensation case when 'a party other than the worker or beneficiary is the appealing party and the worker's or beneficiary's right to relief is sustained,' authorizes fees when an employer voluntarily dismisses the appeal on the first day of trial. We hold that it does.
FACTS
Loren Lee, a retired Boeing maintenance mechanic, filed a claim for benefits in January 1992 for bilateral hearing loss he sustained while employed at Boeing. Boeing denied the claim. After extended proceedings and an appeal by Boeing to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, the Board issued an order remanding the claim to the Department of Labor and Industries with instructions directing Boeing to issue Lee a permanent partial disability payment equal to 27.60 percent of his hearing loss.
Boeing appealed this decision to the King County Superior Court, but on the first day of trial, moved to dismiss its appeal. The trial court granted Boeing's motion to dismiss, but denied Lee's request for attorneys fees under RCW 51.52.130. Lee appeals the denial of his fee request and his motion for reconsideration and seeks attorney fees in the trial court and on appeal.
DISCUSSION
RCW 51.52.130, the Industrial Insurance Act attorney fee provision, authorizes attorney fees:
If, on appeal to the superior or appellate court from the decision and order of the board, said decision and order is reversed or modified and additional relief is granted to a worker or beneficiary, or in cases where a party other than the worker or beneficiary is the appealing party and the worker's or beneficiary's right to relief is sustained, a reasonable fee for the services of the worker's or beneficiary's attorney shall be fixed by the court.
The sole question in this appeal is whether, when an employer appeals an order in favor of a worker but dismisses the appeal before trial, this provision entitles the worker's attorney to reasonable fees.
The Washington Supreme Court recently observed that '{g}iven that attorney fees statutes may serve different purposes, it is important to evaluate the purpose of the specific attorney fees provision and to apply the statute in accordance with that purpose.' Accordingly, courts considering whether to award attorney fees after a voluntary dismissal examine the statute authorizing fees to see whether the claimant satisfies its stated purposes and conditions.
In Andersen v. Gold Seal Vineyards, Inc., the Supreme Court analyzed RCW 4.28.185, Washington's long arm statute, which provides that if a defendant is served outside the state 'and prevails in the action, there may be taxed and allowed to the defendant as part of the costs of defending the action a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorneys' fees.' Relying on federal authority, the court rejected the theory that 'there can be no prevailing party unless an affirmative judgment is entered' and held that attorney fees were authorized despite the fact that the case did not proceed to trial:
We think the general rule pertaining to voluntary nonsuits, that the defendant is regarded as having prevailed, should be applied to cases in which service upon the defendant was obtained under RCW 4.28.185(5). Since that statute was enacted to facilitate service upon out-of-state defendants, the legislature must naturally have had in mind that a defendant who 'prevails' is ordinarily one against whom no affirmative judgment is entered. When an action against such a defendant is
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