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Cochran v. Columbia Gas of Ohio9/26/2000
ant posed a risk to the safety of other employees, and that appellee terminated appellant based on Dr. Litvak's recommendation. Such circumstances constitute a legitimate reason for termination. Laws protecting employees from handicap discrimination do "not require an employer to retain a potentially violent employee. Such a requirement would place the employer on a razor's edge-in jeopardy of violating the if it fired such an employee, yet in jeopardy of being deemed negligent if it retained him and he hurt someone." Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (C.A.7, 1997), 117 F.3d 351, 352. Indeed, the Ohio legislature expressly provided that an employer may terminate a handicapped employee if that employee places other employees at risk. See R.C. 4112.02(L) (stating that R.C. 4112.02 does not require employment of a handicapped person "under circumstances that would significantly increase the occupational hazards affecting * other employees").
Appellant asserts that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the reported incidents took place. The investigators interviewed appellant, however, before he was terminated and knew his side of the story. Even though appellant denies that the incidents occurred, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that appellee terminated appellant because it believed he posed a potential threat. Appellee's reason is lawful. See Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth. (C.A.6, 1991), 941 F.2d 437, 443 (noting that the employer was justified in terminating an employee based on the employer's "good faith" reliance on the report of an evaluating physician, even if the employer had misinterpreted the report); Dister v. Continental Group, Inc. (C.A.2, 1988), 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 ("the reasons tendered need not be well-advised, but merely truthful"); Williams v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. (C.A.5, 1983), 718 F.2d 715, 718 (" he trier of fact is to determine the defendant's intent, not to adjudicate the merits of the facts or suspicions upon which it is predicated"); Brown, at 795, quoting Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications (C.A.11, 1984), 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (" n employer may make employment decisions 'for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason'").
Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that he provided material facts sufficient to withstand appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellant's public policy tort claim.
In order to establish a claim for tortious violation of public policy, appellant must prove the following four elements: (1) a clear public policy manifested in a statute, regulation or the common law; (2) that discharging an employee under circumstances like those involved would jeopardize the policy; (3) that the discharge at issue was motivated by conduct related to the policy; and (4) that there was no overriding business justification for the discharge. Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 151.
We have already determined that appellant failed to establish grounds for relief under R.C. 4112.02. Appellant does not identify any other source of "clear public policy" to sustain his wrongful discharge claim. We therefore overrule appellant's second assignment of error.
In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that he provided material facts sufficient to withstand appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in applying the "clear and convincing evidence standard" to appe
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