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Jackson v. Champaign National Bank & Trust Co.9/26/2000
hout just cause * or otherwise to discriminate against person with regard to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment" on the basis of gender. Ohio courts have held that, when interpreting R.C. Chapter 4112, it is appropriate to look at analogous federal statutes and case law. See Wooten v. Columbus Div. of Water (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 326, 334.
In order to prevail in an employment discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent. Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 587-588. "Discriminatory intent may be proven either directly or indirectly." Goad v. Sterling Commerce, Inc. (June 13, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-321, unreported; see Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 125, 128-129. A plaintiff who seeks to prove discrimination by direct evidence "must prove a causal link or nexus between evidence of a discriminatory statement or conduct and the prohibited act of discrimination to establish a violation." Byrnes, at 130. "Absent some causal connection or link between an employer's discriminatory statements or conduct and a plaintiff-employee, there is no permissible inference that the employer was motivated by discriminatory animus to act against the plaintiff-employee." Id. "The mere fact that an employer may have discriminated against other employees, standing alone, is insufficient." Id.
Appellant argues that the resignation of eleven women from the bank's Urbana branch in the Spring of 1998, plus the testimony from herself and several co-workers that Lamping and Bostelman ignored and belittled women, provides sufficient direct evidence of discrimination to defeat summary judgment. However, appellant fails to link this evidence to her performance evaluation, her alleged demotion or her transfer to Plain City. Without evidence of a causal link, appellant has not provided proof of discriminatory intent using direct evidence.
Although appellant cannot establish discrimination with direct evidence, she may prove her case under the familiar burden-shifting analysis articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792. In order to prevail on her claim of disparate treatment, appellant must first establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was similarly situated to employees who were not members of the protected class; and (3) she was treated differently from such employees. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. (C.A.6, 1992), 964 F.2d 577, 583. If appellant establishes a prima facie case, the bank must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Appellant must then prove that the bank's stated reason was in fact a pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, at 802-804.
A plaintiff is "similarly situated" to others only where "the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare treatment * have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it." Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (C.A.6, 1998), 154 F.3d 344, 352. In her gender discrimination claim, appellant claims that similarly-situated men in the bank were not given poor performance evaluations, were not demoted and were not constructively discharged. Appellant failed to provide sufficient facts, however, to create a genuine issue that she was treated differently than similarly-situated male employees. In an effort to prove that
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