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Cooper v. Amerada Hess Corp.9/15/2000
mon-law transitory-local dichotomy. This conclusion is reinforced by a case interpreting the 1876 Act at a time when courts were thoroughly familiar with common-law pleading: Jemez Land Co. v. Garcia, 15 N.M. 316 (1910), overruled on other grounds by Kalosha v. Novick, 84 N.M. 502, 505 P.2d 845 (1973). In Jemez Land Co., the plaintiff brought suit in the district court of Bernalillo County, alleging that the defendant had trespassed on land owned and possessed by plaintiff in Sandoval County by cutting many small growing trees and piling them into a brush fence around a sub-tract of land. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had threatened plaintiff's employees when they attempted to clear away the brush, which had created a fire hazard. The plaintiff sought one hundred dollars damages for the trees that had been cut and destroyed and a permanent injunction restraining defendant from further cutting of trees and from ever claiming any right, title or interest in plaintiff's land. The defendant answered, setting up as defenses: (1) his ownership of the sub-tract under color of an 1865 deed, and (2) improper venue.
The trial court dismissed the action for improper venue (which at the time Jemez Land Co. was decided, was considered a jurisdictional defect, see Kalosha, 84 N.M. at 504, 505 P.2d at 847). On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the action was properly filed in Bernalillo County as a suit for trespass to land. See C.L. 1897, § 2950, 5 (1876) (now codified as NMSA 1978, § 38-3-1(E)). The defendant argued that the action involved "lands or any interest in lands" and therefore could only have been brought in Sandoval County. See C.L. 1897, § 2950, 4 (1876 (now codified as NMSA 1978, § 38-3-1(D)).
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, observing that plaintiff's position that venue was proper under the provision for suits alleging trespass to land "would, undoubtedly, be correct if the claim for damages was the sole object of the suit." Jemez Land Co., 15 N.M. at 321 (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the complaint also included an equitable cause of action, and that if this equitable claim for injunctive relief was granted, "the appellee would be perpetually restrained from asserting title or any interest whatever in or to the lands in dispute which he claims to be the absolute owner by deed." Id. at 322. The Supreme Court held that an interest in land was "necessarily involved" in the suit. Id.
Jemez Land Co. establishes that a plaintiff may not evade a mandatory venue provision by artful pleading. In most common-law jurisdictions, an action for trespass quare clausum fregit was not a proper method for trying title to real estate. See 21 McKinney, Trespass to Try Title § I; 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 57 (1954) (trespass action not proper means for adjudicating title as between plaintiff and defendant). In a few jurisdictions, such as Texas, an action for trespass could be used to adjudicate title to real property as fully as could be done by an action to quiet title. See 21 McKinney, Trespass to Try Title § I. As noted by the Supreme Court in Jemez Land Co., New Mexico was not among the jurisdictions recognizing trespass to try title as a form of action. Jemez Land Co., 15 N.M. at 323.
Although the plaintiff in Jemez Land Co. characterized its suit as a trespass action, the object of the plaintiff's lawsuit, as revealed by its claim for equitable relief, was not merely to recover damages for tortious interference with its property. Through its equitable claim the plaintiff clearly sought to pre-empt any assertion of title by the defendant under color of the 1865 deed. Looking to the substance of the relief reques
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