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Robertson v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau9/5/2000
ubsequent appeal). Robertson prevailed in his first appeal to the district court to the extent the court decided he had five years of continuous law enforcement service from December 1986 to February 1993, and remanded for further findings. A decision favorable to Robertson on remand to the Bureau would have obviated the need for further appellate review, thus satisfying our policy against piecemeal appeals as well as furthering judicial economy. Under these circumstances, we conclude Robertson's failure to appeal the first district court decision does not preclude him from raising this issue in this appeal.
B.
[ ] Robertson argues he is entitled to the presumption under the version of the law in effect before 1995. The Bureau responds the 1995 version of the statute applies, because Robertson's heart attack occurred in 1997 after the requirement for 5 years of continuous law enforcement service was enacted.
[ ] Generally, unless otherwise provided, statutes in effect on the date of an injury govern workers compensation benefits. Tangen v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 135, 12, 613 N.W.2d 490; Wanstrom v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 17, 7, 604 N.W.2d 860; Jensen v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1997 ND 107, 11, 563 N.W.2d 112; Thompson v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 490 N.W.2d 248, 251 (N.D. 1992). See N.D.C.C. ยง 1-02-10 (stating no part of code retroactive unless expressly declared).
[ ] When Robertson began working in law enforcement in 1982, the applicable law required law enforcement officers to complete two years of continuous service and successfully pass a physical examination which failed to reveal any evidence of the condition. See fn.1. Under the language of that version of the statute, law enforcement officers who had two years of continuous service and had successfully passed a physical examination were entitled to the benefits of the presumption if, and when, they subsequently suffered any condition or impairment of health caused by heart disease. Nothing in the language of either version of the statute precludes application of the presumption once the required time frame was met. Although Robertson did not suffer a heart attack until 1997 and any benefits he may be entitled to would be measured from that date, he had worked continuously in law enforcement from March 1982 through March 1986 and had satisfied the then existing two year requirement for the presumption if, and when, any condition or impairment of health caused by heart disease subsequently manifested itself. Under these circumstances, we conclude Robertson was entitled to the two year requirement for application of the law enforcement presumption in effect before 1995, and we hold March 1982 is the relevant time period for determining whether he successfully passed a physical examination which failed to reveal any evidence of the condition.
C.
[ ] Robertson argues his medical records before 1982 reflect he successfully passed a physical examination which failed to reveal any evidence of a heart condition. The Bureau argues Robertson was not entitled to the presumption, because he admitted he had not undergone a pre-employment physical examination in connection with any of his jobs in law enforcement.
[ ] The obvious purpose of a pre-employment physical examination is to provide a means of establishing an employee is free of the diseases specified in the statute at the onset of employment. See Courtney by Higdem v. City of Orono, 424 N.W.2d 295, 296 (Minn. 1988); Worden v. County of Houston, 356 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1984); Linnell v. City of St. Louis Park, 305 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Minn. 1981); SAIF Corp. v
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